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Pragmatic Formalism, Separation of Powers, and the
Need to Revisit the Nondelegation Doctrine
Martin H. Redish*
In a time where the executive branch continues to grow in size and
strength, reviving the nondelegation doctrine has become more important
than ever. Judicial enforcement of this abandoned rule that Congress cannot
delegate its legislative power serves three vital functions. It preserves the
separation of powers, prevents tyranny, and promotes democratic
accountability. But even if we acknowledge that enforcement of the doctrine
is necessary to preserve the American form of government, a more difficult
question is how the doctrine ought to be enforced. This Article rejects the
formulations of the nondelegation doctrine proposed by both functionalists
and formalists and proposes “pragmatic formalism” as a solution that
carves a path between the two existing theories. After explaining the theory
and applying it to the facts of the Supreme Court’s major nondelegation
cases, the Article also proposes a solution to one of the most difficult
challenges facing the nondelegation doctrine: delegation during times of
national emergency. By advocating for the use of pragmatic formalism to
enforce the nondelegation doctrine, I hope to provide a rule that preserves
the separation of powers, prevents tyranny, and promotes democratic
accountability, but that also takes into account the realities and difficulties
of lawmaking.
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INTRODUCTION
Not long after the Framers ratified the Constitution, the Supreme Court
found itself confronted with the difficult task of defining the roles of the
two political branches. Article I, Section 1 unambiguously vests “all
legislative powers herein granted” in a Congress, and Article II, Section 1
vests the “executive power” in a president.1 Based on this language,
shortly after its inception the Court recognized that Congress cannot
delegate its legislative power.2 But the Court also realized that enforcing
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); id. art. II, § 1
(“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”).
2. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 (1825) (recognizing that Congress cannot delegate
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this constitutional directive would be no easy feat, because doing so
would require the Court to fashion a test for distinguishing legislative
from executive power.3
In 1929, the Court announced a principle that remains, at least in
theory, good law today. In J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Company v. United
States, the Court held that if Congress provides an “intelligible principle”
by which the person authorized to act must conform, Congress has not
delegated its legislative power.4 Shortly thereafter, the Court relied on
this test to invalidate a statute for the first time. In 1935, the Court struck
down two provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act as
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power.5 The Court’s
willingness to invalidate broad delegations, however, did not last for
long.
After 1935, the Court made a dramatic shift in its application of the
nondelegation doctrine and began upholding broad delegations of power
in the name of convenience and expertise.6 For example, in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, the Court upheld a statute granting the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the power to issue
regulations to carry out the Act as “public interest, convenience, or
necessity” requires.7 Although Congress neither defined “public interest”
nor provided any guidance as to the types of regulations the FCC should
promulgate, the Court found that Congress gave as much guidance as it
could be expected to give when addressing the complexities of the radio
industry.8
Since 1935, the Court has not invalidated any statute on nondelegation
grounds. In one of its most recent nondelegation cases, the Court
demonstrated its continued adherence to the highly deferential approach
its legislative power).
3. Id. at 46 (explaining that the “precise boundary” of the legislative and executive powers is “a
subject of delicate and difficult inquiry”).
4. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding that when
there is an intelligible principle to which a person is directed to conform, the action is not a
forbidden delegation).
5. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935).
6. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785–86 (1948) (upholding delegation of
authority to define “excessive” profits); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)
(upholding delegation of authority to SEC to prevent “unfairly or inequitably distribut[ing] voting
power among security holders”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600
(1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine “just and reasonable”
rates).
7. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) (approving the licensing
power of the Commission so long as it pertains to public interest, convenience, or necessity).
8. Id. at 219–20.
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taken in National Broadcasting.9 In Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, decided in 2001, the Court upheld a section of the Clean
Air Act requiring that the EPA promulgate national air quality standards,
“the attainment and maintenance of which,” in the judgment of the
Administrator, “are requisite to protect the public health,” despite
Congress’s failure to provide any instruction on what constitutes “public
health.”10 The Court found that the statute at issue gave sufficient
guidance to satisfy the “intelligible principle” standard,11 indicating that
the standard has become a straw man standing in the place of what used
to be a living doctrine. Given this state of the law, and given that the Court
has not invalidated a single statute on nondelegation grounds since 1935,
many commentators have concluded—with good reason—that the
nondelegation doctrine is, for all practical purposes, dead.12
This is a most unfortunate development for American constitutional
democracy. Without enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, the
foundational precepts of the American system of government are
seriously undermined. If Congress is permitted to delegate its power to
legislate to the executive branch, the power to make and execute the law
will fall into the same hands. Yet, the Framers wisely understood this
aggregation of power to be the very definition of tyranny and therefore
separated the powers among three distinct branches for the very purpose
of preventing such aggregation.13 Thus, to accept an approach where
9. In his Whitman concurrence, Justice Thomas stated that he would be willing, on a future date,
to address “the question of whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our
Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 465 (majority opinion); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019)
(plurality opinion) (effectively avoiding a nondelegation issue by noting that the relevant statute
had been construed narrowly); id. at 2123 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989)) (pointing out that Congress “may confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to
implement and enforce the laws”).
11. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475–76 (explaining that the statute provides an intelligible
principle within the scope of discretion permitted by precedent).
12. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1181, 1182 (2018) (arguing that the “standard” nondelegation doctrine has been replaced with what
he labels “the American nondelegation doctrine”—the rule that “[e]xecutive agencies cannot make
certain kinds of decisions unless Congress has explicitly authorized them to do so”); Thomas W.
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 2097, 2103 (2004) (“The only arguable imprint of the nondelegation doctrine in recent
years has been as a canon of interpretation supporting narrow constructions of statutes so as to
‘avoid’ the constitutional question of excessive delegation.”); Sandra B. Zellmer, The
Nondelegation Doctrine: Fledgling Phoenix or Ill-Fated Albatross?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 11151, 11159 (2001) (“[O]ne wonders whether there is anything of substance left [to
the nondelegation doctrine].”).
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992) (“The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly
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Congress can delegate its legislative power to the executive branch would
be to abandon our constitutional structure. Perhaps because our nation
has not yet seen an abuse of power so extreme that it threatens the
immediate onset of dictatorship, the post-New Deal Court has been
unconcerned with congressional transfers of legislative power to the
executive branch. Not only is this approach inconsistent with clear
constitutional directive, it is also unwise, because, as recent history has
shown, the threat of tyranny is just as real today as it was at the time of
the Constitution’s framing.
Today, Congress is losing power as a political force and the executive
is growing stronger. While Congress enacts roughly fifty laws each year,
some of which merely transfer federal land to states or rename post
offices, executive agencies promulgate approximately 4,000 substantive
rules per year.14 In the few laws it does enact, instead of making difficult
political commitments, Congress often transfers broad swaths of power
to the executive through vague directives.15
This shift of power from Congress to the executive marks a departure
from the power balance initially established by the Constitution. The
Framers undoubtedly structured the federal government so that Congress
would function as the dominant political branch. Before the adoption of
the Constitution, under the Articles of Confederation, the federal
government had only one political branch: a Congress. 16 Due to the
shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation, however, the Framers
recognized that, if only as a practical matter, Congress could not run the
country on its own. Congress was simply too large and too diverse to
make decisions quickly. Thus, it needed an agent to execute its laws in
specific contexts that may arise.17 To fill this void, the Framers created
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
14. See Igbor Bobic & Matt Fuller, Congress is Failing: So Much for Checks and Balances,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/congress-trump-oversight
_n_5ccb4df5e4b0d12395507c0d [perma.cc/PZ74-FN45] (explaining that while Congress passes
about fifty laws each year, executive agencies issue about 4,000 substantive rules every year).
15. See infra Part II (discussing Congress’ transfers of power to the executive). See also Merrill,
supra note 12, at 2159 (“On virtually all matters of legislative policy, the Executive leads, and
Congress follows. Sometimes Congress can frustrate or impede the Executive by refusing to enact
legislation sought by the President, rejecting presidential appointments, or modifying presidential
appropriations requests. But only rarely does Congress take the initiative in setting national
policy.”).
16. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for
Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 407 (2017)
17. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (September 3, 1780), reprinted in 2
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 404 (H. Syrett ed., 1961) [hereinafter Letter to James
Duane] (explaining that Congress, as “numerous as it is, [is] constantly fluctuating, [and cannot]
act with sufficient decision”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer
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the executive branch. As the vesting clause of Article II, Section 1 makes
clear,18 the executive branch was not established to function as the
dominant policymaker for the country, rather it was formed primarily to
implement Congress’s laws.
In recent years, respected constitutional scholars have dismissed as
empty formalism the concern that the nondelegation doctrine’s atrophy
threatens the onset of tyranny. Instead, they focus on what they see as the
functional benefits to which legislative delegation gives rise. But the
current aggregation of both lawmaking and executive powers in the
executive branch shows that the threat of tyranny has not dissipated.
Illustrative is the current chief executive’s widespread disregard for the
role given to Congress by the Constitution. As one source put it, our
current president is taking “defiance of Congress to a level we have not
seen before.”19 For example, in February 2019, after Congress refused to
allocate the funds the president wanted to construct his promised wall
along the United States-Mexico border, he declared a national emergency
for no reason other than to bypass Congress and obtain the funds to begin
construction.20 He acknowledged that the situation did not constitute a
genuine emergency and admitted that he declared a national emergency
solely to circumvent congressional authority. 21 The president’s
declaration of a national emergency as a strategy to circumvent Congress
exemplifies his disrespect for Congress as the primary policymaking
body. Given this state of affairs, any skeptic who argues that the Framers’
fear of tyranny is no longer realistic ought to pay closer attention to very
ominous current events.22
To prevent tyranny and maintain the separation of powers, the Court
should revisit its current application of the nondelegation doctrine and
revive the dictate that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power.
Enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine preserves the separation of
powers, ensuring that all political power will not be concentrated in the
Books 1992) (“In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite under
the confederation to the complete execution of every important measure, that proceeds from the
Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been
executed . . . .”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
19. Bobic & Fuller, supra note 14.
20. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency
-trump.html [perma.cc/V2BB-EQ6Z].
21. When declaring the emergency, President Trump stated he could build the wall over a longer
period of time but that he “didn’t need to do [that]” and he would “rather do it much faster.” Id.
22. In this context, it should be noted that numerous observers have recently raised what they
consider the very real danger that the current occupant of the White House will refuse to leave
office if defeated in the 2020 presidential election.
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one branch whose assumption of such power is most likely to lead to
tyranny: the executive branch.
The nondelegation doctrine also serves another vital function:
promotion of democratic accountability. Enforcement of the doctrine
requires Congress, the only branch elected directly by the voting public,
to make fundamental policy decisions and prevents Congress from
avoiding their constitutionally-dictated lawmaking function by passing
off these decisions to administrative agencies, which do not answer to the
American people.
The supposedly insoluble problem to which functionalist scholars
regularly point is the difficulty in conceptually separating the legislative
from the executive powers. The task, they argue, is hopeless. The
executive power of implementation, it is contended, often requires as
much discretionary choice as does legislating, and where the dividing line
is to be drawn is invariably arbitrary. Therefore, the central task for
anyone who argues that the Court should revisit the nondelegation
doctrine, as I do, is to develop a theoretical and doctrinal model for its
enforcement. Performing this task is no easy feat, given that any method
of enforcement must guide the Court as it wades through the murky
distinction between legislative and executive authority.
The task in this Article, then, is twofold. First, I need to establish that,
without some meaningful form of the constitutionally-dictated
nondelegation doctrine, the foundations of our constitutional structure are
seriously undermined. Second, I must provide a workable standard—
meaning at least as workable as most constitutional standards, virtually
all of which are plagued by varying levels of uncertainty—to guide courts
in implementing and enforcing it.
The scholarly debate over how the Court should enforce the doctrine
is for the most part divided into two camps: the formalists and
functionalists. On one side of the debate, functionalists support broad
delegations of power and argue that Congress should be able to give away
its legislative authority if it so chooses. Some functionalists argue that
today, administrative agencies are better positioned than Congress to
make foundational policy choices and that a robust nondelegation
doctrine could not coexist with the modern administrative state, in which
the executive branch acts as the primary lawmaker.23 Such nakedly
23. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 12, at 2177–78 (discussing the difference between the formalist
and functionalist approaches); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 778 (1999) (discussing how social complexity makes it
difficult for legislatures to predict the consequences of their choices); E. Donald Elliot, INS v.
Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 167 (arguing that the new “vast administrative bureaucracy” fundamentally alters the
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functionalist arguments must be summarily rejected if the foundations of
our constitutional system are to survive. If the nondelegation doctrine is
to serve the essential function of preserving the separation of powers, it
must begin from the formal rule that Congress cannot delegate the
legislative power vested in it by Article I, Section 1.24 Any functionalist
formulation of the nondelegation doctrine that enables Congress to
transfer its legislative power in the name of convenience or expertise
fatally erodes the separation between the branches, thereby undermining
one of the Framers’ key methods of avoiding tranny.
On the other side of the debate, formalist scholars believe in a complete
separation among the three branches and posit that any delegation of
legislative power is per se unconstitutional.25 But the significant hurdle
for the formalists is the very problem to which the functionalists have
pointed: the difficulties of definition and application. To the formalists,
everything turns on how one defines the terms “legislative” and
“executive,” and neither the definition nor application of this definitional
dichotomy lends itself to the rigidity of formalist analysis. 26
To enforce the nondelegation doctrine, I propose an alternative
analytical model: “pragmatic formalism.” The theory, which I previously
developed in a broader constitutional context,27 is grounded in the
formalist rule that no branch may exercise any authority that does not fall
within the categories of power constitutionally granted to it. I start with
this principle because, on the most basic level, a formal understanding of
the separation of powers is the only way to help assure the prevention of
the onset of tyranny. Otherwise, the prophylactic interest in separation of
powers will invariably be consumed by the competing interests of
convenience and expertise. But unlike traditional formalist models,
which often ignore the realities of the legislative process, pragmatic
formalism takes practical considerations into account in defining the
terms “legislative” and “executive.” In doing so, the theory draws on the
Framers’ primary reason for creating an executive in the first place: the
practical inability of Congress to make quick decisions when

conditions under which delegation traditionally functions).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
25. See generally David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
26. For a formalist’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine, see generally Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002).
27. See generally Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991) (proposing
the theory of pragmatic formalism and applying it in the separation of powers context).
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circumstances demand such action.28
To determine whether a statute impermissibly delegates legislative
power or instead properly vests executive power in the executive branch,
a court applying pragmatic formalism will engage in two inquiries. First,
the court will ask whether Congress has made a sufficiently detailed
political commitment to improve voters’ ability to judge the values,
ideology, or socio-political wisdom of their elected representatives.
Congress provides sufficient guidance when it has made the necessary
political commitment such that voters who learn how their
representatives voted on the legislation in question would be better
informed about their representatives’ positions.29 A legislator’s vote for
or against a blanket delegation of lawmaking power fails to achieve this
constitutional goal. A sufficiently detailed political commitment
constitutes a necessary condition to find that in enacting a law Congress
has properly exercised its legislative power and has not simply delegated
its lawmaking power to the executive branch.
I recognize one narrow qualification on this first tenet of pragmatic
formalism. When Congress enacts a law addressing generic national
emergencies, it is not feasible for Congress to make a political
commitment with sufficient detail, for the simple reason that Congress
cannot be expected to predict the shape of a future emergency. In such
situations, I propose the following procedural modification to the rule that
Congress must articulate a political commitment: Congress may enact
statutes vesting broad, unguided discretion in the executive during times
of genuine but unforeseen emergency when Congress itself cannot
reasonably be expected to make the initial decision as to how to respond.
The executive’s discretion to act during these emergencies, it should be
emphasized, is strictly limited to the period of time in which Congress
itself lacks the practical ability to make the initial policy decision. As
soon as Congress has had sufficient time to consider the situation and act,
the executive may continue to act only if Congress approves of his or her
actions through formal enactment of legislation. Both factual questions—
i.e., whether a true emergency exists in the first place and how much time
is needed for Congress to legislatively approve the emergency actions of
the executive—are to be finally determined in the individual case by the
judiciary as “constitutional facts.”30
The second inquiry under pragmatic formalism—consistent with the
28. See infra Section II.A (discussing the reason the Framers’ wanted to create the executive
branch).
29. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 5–16 (1995)
(explaining textualism, formalism, constitutional structure, and delegation of powers).
30. See infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary’s final determination in
“constitutional facts”).
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“pragmatic” component of the theory—requires the court in defining the
terms “legislative” and “executive” to keep in mind why the Framers
decided to create the executive branch in the first place. If Congress could
not have feasibly made the decision it vested in the executive branch due
to the fact that execution of the congressional policy choice required an
on-the-spot decision, that decision properly vests executive power. A
decision cannot be considered legislative if Congress would not have a
reasonable opportunity to make that decision the first place.
By adhering to the formalist directive that Congress cannot delegate
its legislative power, but by defining the concepts of “legislative” and
“executive” pragmatically, pragmatic formalism accomplishes what both
the formalists and functionalists have failed to do. It provides a method
for enforcing the nondelegation doctrine that will preserve the separation
of powers while simultaneously providing Congress with the flexibility
it needs to enable the executive branch to serve the purpose it was wisely
created to serve. The purpose was to implement congressional policy
choices in the real world and to act in situations requiring a response
faster than could come from the legislative process.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the development of
the nondelegation doctrine to show how the doctrine has weakened over
time to the point of virtual nonexistence, and to provide context for the
discussion that follows. In Part II, I argue that the Court should revive the
nondelegation doctrine and, in so doing, I respond to the primary
arguments asserted by those who oppose the doctrine’s revival. In Part
III, I contend that the Court should employ the theory of pragmatic
formalism to interpret and enforce the nondelegation doctrine. This
section explains the theory of pragmatic formalism and applies it to the
facts presented in several of the Court’s most significant delegation cases.
This application demonstrates that using pragmatic formalism to enforce
the nondelegation doctrine does not require the Court to invalidate all
prior delegations of discretion to the executive, as rigid formalist theories
may come close to doing. In Part IV, I propose an important procedural
modification of the constitutionally dictated directive that Congress is
required to enact only those statutes that contain a sufficiently detailed
political commitment: when Congress enacts statutes addressing the
possibility of unforeseen national emergencies, as already noted, it will
effectively be impossible for Congress to provide a clear normative
directive, for the simple reason that it will be impossible for Congress to
predict what the specific emergency will be. The executive will
necessarily make the initial decision as to how to respond. There is simply
no alternative. But in order to reconcile the practical realities of the need
to deal with an emergent situation promptly with our constitutionally
dictated system of separation of powers, I propose that the Constitution
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be construed to dictate a procedural restriction. That limitation confines
the executive’s ability to deal with the emergency unguided by legislative
directive to the time period it takes to obtain congressional approval.
Absent such prompt legislative approval, the executive action is to be
immediately rendered constitutionally invalid. After explaining the
modification in more detail, I apply it to the National Emergencies Act
and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act to illustrate both its benefits
and scope.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The vesting clause of Article I provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.”31 Many years ago, the
Court interpreted this provision, along with the Framers’ decision to
separate the three types of power into three distinct branches, as
establishing the nondelegation doctrine: the rule that Congress cannot
constitutionally delegate its legislative power to the executive branch.32
This section traces the development of the nondelegation doctrine from
the Court’s first delegation cases in the early 1800s until today, in order
to show how the doctrine has weakened over time and to provide the
necessary context for the normative constitutional analysis that follows.
A. Early Nondelegation Cases
Not long after the Constitution was ratified, the Court began to
confront constitutional challenges to congressional delegations of
power.33 In these early cases, the Court unambiguously adopted the rule
that Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority to the executive
branch. For example, in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, the Court stated:
“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the constitution.”34
Enforcement of this rule led to the difficult question of deciding when
Congress has in fact delegated legislative power or simply exercised its
legislative power, leaving to the executive branch solely the powers of
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
32. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
33. See generally Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382 (1813) (confronting a
congressional delegation to the executive for the first time); id. at 382–83 (noting that Congress
passed an Act providing that if the president finds that Great Britain or France violated US trade
policy, the Act’s prohibition on trade with those nations shall take effect); id. at 387–88 (finding
that the Act did not delegate legislative power and provided the brief rationale that it “see[s] no
sufficient reason[] why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in [passing] . . . the act . . .
either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct”). As will be seen, this deferential
approach proved to be aberrational.
34. Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
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implementation and enforcement. Defining legislative power would
require the Court to wade into the murky distinction between legislative
and executive authority and fashion a test for how to distinguish the two.
In the 1825 case of Wayman v. Southard, Chief Justice Marshall began
the opinion by stating:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes
the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the
discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this
power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court
will not enter unnecessarily.35

In an attempt to distinguish the legislative power from both executive
and judicial powers, the Court articulated the following circular principle:
Congress cannot delegate “important subjects” that are “strictly and
exclusively legislative.” But, for subjects of “less interest,” Congress may
articulate “a general provision” and allow another branch the power to
“fill up the details.”36 The Court did not provide any guidance as to which
subjects are of “importance” or of “less interest.” Nor did it define
legislative. Unsurprisingly, then, this abstract test did not reappear in
subsequent cases.
The Court’s early cases took a largely pragmatic approach to
evaluating delegations. In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, the Court
addressed a challenge to an Act that allowed the president to suspend the
duty-free status of certain goods if the president found that the nation
exporting those goods imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable”
restrictions on American imports.37 In the event that the president should
decide to suspend the duty-free status, Congress prescribed in the Act that
the duties should be levied on particular exports.38 The Court upheld the
Act, explaining that the statute allows the president to act as a “mere
agent” of Congress when deciding whether to suspend the duty-free status
of certain goods.39 The Court further explained:
[The legislature] can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
facts or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 (1825).
Id. at 43.
Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
Id. at 692–93.
Id. at 693.
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power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation.40

Shortly after Marshall Field, the Court again took a common-sense
approach to a nondelegation challenge in Buttfield v. Stranahan. There,
the Court upheld the Tea Inspection Act, which gave the Secretary of the
Treasury the power to establish standards of quality for all teas imported
into the United States.41 The Court interpreted the Act to establish the
policy of prohibiting imports of the lowest grade of tea and found
Congress’s guidance to be sufficient.42 As in Marshall Field, the Court
in Buttfield recognized the practical limitations on Congress’s ability to
legislate. It explained: “Congress legislated on the subject as far as was
reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was
compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the
result pointed out by the statute.”43 In both Marshall Field and Buttfield,
then, the Court determined whether Congress had delegated legislative
power by looking to the circumstances surrounding the legislation in
question and asking whether Congress could have provided any
additional guidance or whether it had to rely on the executive to
implement its policy due to its inability to predict how the future would
unfold.
In the 1929 landmark case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
the Court first articulated the “intelligible principle” standard, one that, at
least theoretically, continues to govern delegation cases today. 44 In
Hampton, the Court upheld the flexible tariff provision of the 1922 Tariff
Act, which vested in the president the authority to alter any tariff set in
the Act when the president found that the amount set by Congress did not
equalize the difference in cost of production between domestic and
foreign producers.45 In upholding the provision, the Court again took a
pragmatic approach to the question of delegation. It explained that the
“extent and character” of a congressional delegation must be evaluated
according to “common sense” and the inherent necessity of coordination
40. Id. at 694 (citing Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498–99 (1873)).
41. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 494, 496 (1904).
42. Id. at 495–96.
43. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (“[W]e repeatedly have said that
when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform.’”).
45. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412–13. The Act also provided that the president could not increase
or decrease the rate by more than 50 percent and identified factors for the president to consider
when increasing or decreasing a tariff. Id. at 401–02.
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among the branches.46 The Court explained that because Congress could
not feasibly set a new rate each time domestic or foreign prices shifted,
Congress passed the flexible tariff provision to allow the president to
decide whether a change in rate was necessary to carry out the goal of the
Tariff Act.47 The Court then articulated the following rule: “If Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”48 In
the nondelegation cases that followed, this rule became known as the
intelligible principle standard and remains, at least in theory, good law
today. As I will show, the standard established in Hampton has served
effectively as a license to Congress, giving it a free pass in delegating its
lawmaking authority to the executive.49 But this current version of the
intelligible principle standard is by no means a proper reading of
Hampton. In that decision, the Court was quite definitely seeking to draw
a conceptual dichotomy between the legislative and executive powers.
The fact remains, however, that the Court in Hampton was defining those
concepts in a manner consistent with the highly pragmatic framework that
the Framers transformed into a foundational conceptual framework in the
Constitution.50
B. Enforcement During the New Deal
In 1935, for the first time, the Court struck down a statutory provision
as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Exhibiting a
resistance to President Roosevelt’s dramatic expansion of the executive
branch during the New Deal, the Court invalidated two provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). First, in Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, the Court confronted a challenge to a section of the NIRA that
authorized the president to prohibit the interstate transportation of “hot
oil,” i.e., oil produced in excess of the quotas set by state law.51 The Court
found that the Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power,
reasoning that the question of whether to prohibit the transportation of
hot oil is “obviously one of legislative policy” and that the NIRA did not

46. Id. at 406.
47. Id. at 404–05, 407.
48. Id. at 409.
49. See infra Section II.C (analyzing the danger posed by Congress’s continued loss, and the
executive’s usurpation, of political and legislative power).
50. See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a pragmatic
formalist approach to implement the nondelegation doctrine).
51. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405–06 (1935); see also id. at 436 (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
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provide any guidance as to whether or under what circumstances the
president should do so.52 Thus, the Court concluded, section 9(c) of the
NIRA unconstitutionally gave the president “unlimited authority to
determine the policy.”53
Later that same year, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, the Court struck down another provision of the NIRA. 54 In
Schechter, the Court addressed section 3 of the NIRA, which gave the
president the power to approve codes of fair competition for the
“protection of consumers” and in “furtherance of the public interest” to
effectuate the policy of the Act.55 Like in Panama Refining, the Court
held that section 3 impermissibly delegated legislative power. It found
that the delegation in section 3 was even broader than the hot oil
provision in section 9(c), which at least identified the subject that the
president would regulate: hot oil. In section 3, however, Congress failed
to provide any definition of “fair competition,” nor did it provide any
guidance as to the subject matter that the codes should regulate.56 The
Court concluded that section 3 gave the president the “unfettered”
discretion to adopt any code he found advisable for the rehabilitation of
trade or industry, one of the broad general purposes Congress gave for
passing the Act.57
The Court’s willingness to invalidate laws as unconstitutional
delegations of legislative power did not last for long. To this day, Panama
Refining and Schechter stand as the only two cases in which the Court
invalidated a statute on nondelegation grounds.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 415 (majority opinion).
Id. at 415, 433.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935).
Congress’s stated policy for the NIRA was:
[T]o remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce
which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general
welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of
cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action
of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and
supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest
possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid
undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to
increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing
purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards
of labor; and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and conserve natural resources.
Id. at 534–35.
56. Id. at 535, 541.
57. Id. at 541–42.
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C. Post-New Deal Enforcement
Shortly after it decided Panama Refining and Schechter, the Court—
quickly realigned due to the appointment of Pro-New Deal Justices—
drastically altered its application of the nondelegation doctrine by
upholding broad delegations in the name of a functionalist perspective on
separation of powers.58 For example, in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, the Court upheld section 303 of the 1934 Communications
Act, which authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to issue regulations to carry out the Act as “public interest, convenience,
and necessity” requires.59 The Court explained that Congress’s directive
that the FCC regulate in the “public interest, convenience, or necessity”
must be interpreted in the context of the complex and rapidly changing
radio industry.60 Evaluated in this context, the delegation was found to
be “as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit.”61 But of course, this was simply wrong. If
Congress had done its job, it could have developed some basic normative
guidelines to direct the executive agency’s enforcement. Instead, its
directive to the FCC was nothing more than an authorization to make both
law and policy.
One year later, in Yakus v. United States, the Court upheld an equally
broad delegation of power to an administrative agency. 62 In the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Congress authorized a Price
Administrator to fix prices of commodities that “in his judgment will be
generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of the Act”
when he finds that “prices ‘have risen or threaten to rise to an extent or
in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.’”63 The Court
upheld the Act, reasoning that it provided a legislative objective,
prescribed the method of achieving that objective, and articulated
standards to guide the Administrator’s determination of when it should
fix prices and how prices should be fixed.64 The Court recognized the
58. Some argue that this shift in the Court’s attitude can be attributed to President Roosevelt’s
Court-packing plan. Frustrated by the Court’s resistance to the New Deal, President Roosevelt
proposed a bill that would allow him to pack the Court. The plan never came to fruition, however,
as the mere threat seemed to produce Roosevelt’s intended result. Beginning with West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, a 1937 case upholding a state minimum wage law, the Court warmed up to the New
Deal legislation. 300 U.S. 379. In the years that followed West Coast Hotel, the Court routinely
upheld broad delegations of lawmaking power. See Zellmer, supra note 12 at 11154.
59. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
60. Id. at 216.
61. Id. (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
62. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944).
63. Id. at 420.
64. Id. at 423.
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role that functional considerations played in its holding. It explained that
“[t]he Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress
the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality . . . to perform its
function.”65 The Court then articulated the following rule:
[O]nly if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the
guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible
in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has
been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means
for effecting its declared purpose of preventing inflation.66

Without formally overruling Hampton, the Court in Yakus effectively
relaxed Hampton’s standard that Congress must provide an “intelligible
principle” and instead required that Congress need only provide
something more than a complete “absence” of guidance.
The Court continued to uphold broad delegations in the name of
functionalism into the latter part of the twentieth century. In Mistretta v.
United States, the Court upheld the United States Sentencing
Commission’s promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines as a valid use
of executive power.67 The Sentencing Reform Act established the United
States Sentencing Commission and gave the Commission the power to
devise sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense and
“establish general policies . . . as are necessary to carry out the purposes”
of the Act.68 The Court upheld the Act, explaining that “[d]eveloping
proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually
limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, laborintensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially
appropriate.”69 The Court then reaffirmed its holding in Yakus that a
delegation will stand unless there is an “absence of standards.”70
Puzzlingly, Justice Scalia began the majority opinion in Mistretta by
recognizing that “‘the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress
generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”71 But
the Court nevertheless pushed aside the foundational precept of American
political and constitutional theory in the name of a “practical
understanding” that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with
ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 425 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 426.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
Id. at 368–69.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 371–72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
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its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”72
The Court’s application of the nondelegation doctrine during the mid
to late twentieth century was characterized by the use of the naked
functionalist approach adopted in National Broadcasting and Mistretta,
where the Court upheld broad delegations of power in the name of
convenience and expertise.73 Since the Court’s invalidation of two
provisions of the NIRA during the New Deal, the Court has watered down
the nondelegation doctrine into a toothless relic of its former self. As a
practical matter, as both its supporters and critics recognize, the
nondelegation doctrine now exists in name only.
In one of the Court’s most recent nondelegation cases, Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations, the Court continued the trend of
allowing Congress to delegate broad swaths of power. In Whitman, the
Court upheld § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, which requires that the
EPA Administrator promulgate national ambient air quality standards,
“the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator . . . are requisite to protect the public health.”74 Justice
Scalia explained that the delegation was “well within the outer limits of
our nondelegation precedents,” citing Yakus and National
Broadcasting.75 The Court’s opinion concluded with what some might
have interpreted as the final nail in the nondelegation doctrine’s coffin. It
stated: “In short, we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can
be left to those executing or applying the law.’”76
In a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, Justice Stevens pulled back the curtain on majority’s approach.
He explained:
The Court has two choices. We could choose to articulate our ultimate
disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that the power
delegated to the EPA is “legislative” but nevertheless conclude that the
delegation is constitutional because adequately limited by the terms of
the authorizing statute. Alternatively, we could pretend, as the Court
72. Id. at 372.
73. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785–86 (1948) (upholding delegation of
authority to define “excessive profits”); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104–05
(1946) (upholding delegation of authority to SEC to prevent “unfairly or inequitably distribut[ing]
voting power among security holders”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
600 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine “just and reasonable”
rates).
74. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
75. Id. at 474.
76. Id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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does, that the authority delegated to the EPA is somehow not
“legislative power.” . . . I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and
more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit
that agency rulemaking authority is “legislative power.”77

Justice Stevens then opined that Congress may delegate “legislative”
power so long as it provides an intelligible principle, though at no point
in modern memory has the Court ever demanded inclusion of a truly
intelligible principle.78
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion but also wrote separately to
express his concern that there may be a genuine constitutional problem
with section 109(b)(1).79 He noted that, although neither of the parties
asked the Court to reconsider its delegation jurisprudence, he would be
willing to address on a future day “the question [of] whether our
delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’
understanding of separation of powers.”80
The Court’s concession in Whitman that it has “almost never felt
qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law,”81
arguably confirmed what many had already claimed: the nondelegation
doctrine is dead.
The scholarly debate over whether the Court should return to a robust
application of the nondelegation doctrine is hotly contested. Some argue
for the revival of the nondelegation doctrine on originalist grounds.82
Others take a functionalist approach to the issue of delegation, arguing
that Congress should be able to delegate its legislative power given the
size of the federal government and the necessity of delegation under the
current administrative state.83 The debate over the nondelegation doctrine
77. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 488–90. It is worth noting the blatant inconsistency in Justice Stevens’ statement. It is
unclear how the power vested in the EPA could be defined as “legislative” despite being
“adequately limited” by the authorizing statute. Id. at 488. The entire purpose of the “intelligible
principle” standard is that if a statute provides an intelligible principle, this guidance makes it such
that the statute does not delegate legislative power.
79. Id. at 486–87 (Thomas, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 487.
81. Id. at 474–75 (majority opinion) (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
82. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto:
A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New
York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 270–72 (2001) (arguing that the original meaning of the Constitution
supports a strict version of the doctrine in most areas of the law and that the doctrine does not apply
to areas of the law where executives traditionally received broad delegations).
83. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine
for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1415–16 (2000) (arguing that Congress should
be able to delegate its lawmaking authority so long as the administrative agency issues rules
containing reasonable limits on their discretion); Merrill, supra note 12, at 2164 (arguing that
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has focused on two questions: first, whether the Court should revive the
nondelegation doctrine and second, if so, what method the Court should
employ to determine when a delegation is of legislative power.
In Gundy v. United States, decided last term, the Court found that
Congress’s delegation to the Attorney General to “specify the
applicability” of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) registration requirements to offenders convicted before
SORNA’s enactment does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.84 In a
plurality opinion written by Justice Kagan,85 the Court first resolved the
issue of whether SORNA gives the Attorney General the ability to decide
if the Act should apply retroactively or whether the Act required a
retroactive application.
Petitioner Gundy, a pre-Act offender, argued that SORNA empowers
the Attorney General to decide if the Act’s registration requirements
apply to pre-Act offenders, but the Court rejected this argument and
instead found that Congress made clear that SORNA’s registration
requirements must apply to pre-Act offenders. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court first cited its 2012 decision in Reynolds v. United
States as having already decided this issue.86 It then reaffirmed the
rationale given in Reynolds, namely that SORNA’s purpose and history
revealed Congress’s intent for the Act’s registration requirements to
cover pre-Act offenders.87 The Court explained that Congress merely
delegated to the Attorney General the task of implementing the Act’s
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as was feasible.88
Having resolved the issue of how the Act ought to be interpreted, the

Congress should be permitted to delegate its legislative power as long as it chooses which body
shall exercise the power because “as a body of generalists whose principal area of expertise is
politics, [Congress] should be able to resolve such questions of institutional choice more effectively
than determining the substance of specific policies”).
84. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (plurality opinion). 34 U.S.C. §
20913(d) provides:
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the
requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this
chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the
registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are
unable to comply with subsection (b) [which lays out registration requirements].
34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2017).
85. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg joined in the plurality opinion. Gundy, 139 S. Ct.
at 2121 (plurality opinion). Justice Alito, who concurred in the judgment, provided the fifth vote.
Id. at 2130 (Alito, J., concurring). He wrote separately to add that he would support an effort to
reconsider the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence at a future time. Id. at 2131.
86. See generally Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012).
87. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 2125.
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Court held that section 20913(d) does not violate the nondelegation
doctrine. The Court described the “intelligible principle” standard as “not
demanding” and, citing to National Broadcasting, Yakus, and Whitman,
explained that it has “over and over upheld even very broad
delegations.”89 It recognized that although Congress may not transfer
powers which are “strictly and exclusively legislative,”90 Congress may
“confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to implement and
enforce the laws.”91 Echoing the functionalist approach adopted in
Mistretta, the Court stated: “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional,
then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is
on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its
programs.”92 The Court concluded by explaining that giving the Attorney
General discretion in applying the registration requirements is precisely
the type of judgment often left to executive officials. 93 Thus, nothing in
Gundy in any way altered the widely held view that the nondelegation
doctrine is effectively moribund.
II. REVIVING THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
In one sense, the thesis of this Article is all too simple: The Court
should revive the nondelegation doctrine because of the doctrine’s vital
importance to both the structure and operation of the American
government. Enforcement of the doctrine preserves the separation of
powers established by the Constitution, serves as a prophylactic measure
against tyranny, and promotes democratic accountability. As I already
have made clear, however, there is far more to it than simple acceptance
of these foundational normative principles of American political theory.
But while acceptance of these theoretical precepts may not constitute a
sufficient condition for acceptance of the pragmatic formalist approach
to the nondelegation doctrine, it surely does constitute a necessary
condition. My first task, then, is to convince the reader of the centrality
of these precepts to the core premise of American political and
constitutional thought. It is therefore to this initial task that I now turn.

89. Id. at 2129.
90. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1825) (“It will not be contended that Congress
can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.”).
91. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372 (1989)).
92. Id. at 2130.
93. Id. at 2130.
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A. The Importance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in American Political
Theory
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers for the most part vested the
legislative and executive power in separate and distinct branches of the
federal government,94 and they did so for very important reasons. Article
I, Section 1 reads: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States . . . .”95 In Article II, the Constitution
vests “[t]he executive Power” in a president of the United States.96 This
separation of political power was no accident. Based on their experiences,
both with England and the several states, the Framers knew of the danger
that arises when the same body of government houses the power both to
formulate and execute the law. Quoting Montesquieu, James Madison
wrote: “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body . . . there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may
arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to
execute them in a tyrannical manner.”97
Madison noted that the plan of the Convention adopted a
nondelegation principle.98 He recognized that each branch could not be
kept “totally separate and distinct” from the others—for example the
president has the power to make treaties with other nations, which have
the force of law—but explained that the “whole” power of one branch
cannot be exercised by another department.99 When Congress delegates
its legislative power to the executive branch, the Constitution’s separation
94. In what constituted a rather dramatic departure from traditional separation-of-power theory,
the Framers chose to incorporate the president into the legislative process through the presentment
requirement and the potential exercise of the veto power. They obviously concluded that such an
observation was justified by the need for checks and balances. However, this does not alter the fact
that social policy choices are to be made in the first instance by the approval of both Houses of
Congress.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
96. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 13, at 246.
98. Madison pointed to the Constitution of Massachusetts, which declared “that the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them.” Id. at 247. He then stated: “This
declaration . . . is not in a single point violated by the plan of the Convention.” Id.
99. Id. at 249, 245. The Court has repeatedly recognized the separation of powers rationale for
the nondelegation doctrine. For example, in Mistretta v. United States, the Court explained: “The
nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
system of Government.” 488 U.S. 361, 371(1989). Likewise, in Industrial Union Department, AFLCIO v. American Petroleum Institute, Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence, referred to the doctrine
as “the nondelegation principle of separation of powers,” 448 U.S. 607, 674 (1980), and in Loving
v. United States, the Court recognized the nondelegation doctrine as a “strand of [the Court’s]
separation-of-powers jurisprudence.” 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996).
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of powers collapses, as the same body can both proscribe and enforce the
law. Judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine is thus essential
to preserving the Constitution’s separation of powers.
By preserving the separation of powers, judicial enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine protects the fundamental goal that the Framers
sought to achieve: the avoidance of tyranny. The Framers wisely
understood tyranny not simply as the abuse of power but as the
accumulation of power in the same hands. In Madison’s words: “The
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”100 Recognizing that “power is of an encroaching nature,” the
Framers knew that the time to stop an accumulation of power was before
it had begun.101 As Jefferson stated in his Notes on the State of Virginia:
“The time to guard against corruption and tyranny, is before they shall
have gotten hold on us. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than
to trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have entered.”102
To prevent the aggregation of power in the same hands, the Framers
vested the legislative power in “a Congress,” the executive power in “a
President,” and the judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”103 The Framers could have resorted to other methods of
dividing power among the branches. They could, for example, have
established a system where the branches would be free to exercise any
type of power they saw fit, until that power reached a level deemed by a
designated authority to border on tyranny or, more cautiously, reached a
level presenting the clear and present danger of tyranny. But because of
the Framers’ focus on the importance of preventing tyranny, they rejected
such approaches and instead chose a structure of government that would
stop an accumulation of power before enough time had passed to allow
for that accumulation to turn into tyrannical abuse of power.
Enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would also promote
democratic accountability, as it would force Congress to make difficult
policy decisions instead of punting those choices to the executive branch.
It is true, of course, that the president is elected, as are the members of
Congress.104 But members of Congress are, of course, far more
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 13, at 244.
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
102. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William Peden ed., 1955).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1.
104. It should be noted, however, that because of the Electoral College, in two of the last five
elections, the victorious candidate for president won the presidency despite the fact that he lost the
popular vote.
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responsive to those whom they represent than the president. In any event,
legislative delegations are only rarely exercised by the president directly.
Rather, most are exercised by administrative agencies, whose
accountability to either the president or the electorate is at best limited.105
Congress rightly relies on administrative agencies to implement its policy
judgments since it is their constitutionally dictated function to do so.
However, since the rise of the administrative state during the New Deal,
Congress has allowed administrative agencies to take center stage as the
primary lawmakers by drafting statutes with all but totally unlimited
directives that allow the agencies to regulate with virtually no guidance.
When Congress enacts a statute that gives little or no guidance to an
agency, the American system of government ceases to function in the
manner contemplated by the Constitution. Under our system of
representative democracy, “we the people” vote to elect representatives
and those representatives vote for laws on behalf of the people they
represent. Unlike a direct democracy, where laws are passed by a direct
and popular vote, the only way American citizens have any say in the
laws that govern them is through their elected representatives. If citizens
disapprove of how their elected representative voted on a particular law,
they can vote to replace that representative the following term. But when
Congress enacts a law allowing federal agencies to promulgate binding
rules without giving guidance as to what or how those rules should
regulate, the American people lack any means to properly assess their
elected representatives. In other words, when Congress passes a law
allowing an agency to regulate “in the public interest,” our elected
representatives might as well be exercising a secret ballot.
Congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies might not be as concerning from the perspective of democratic
theory if the voting public could hold administrative agencies
accountable. But while the president oversees administrative agencies in
theory, this presidential oversight does not make the agencies publicly
accountable in practice. First, the massive size of the administrative state
makes it difficult for the president to oversee all decisions made at the
agency level.106 Second, a subset of agencies—so-called “independent
agencies”—are further insulated from presidential oversight because the
president may only remove the members of independent agencies for

105. See REDISH, supra note 29, at 143 (“This indirect accountability comes, then, at best in an
extremely diluted form.”).
106. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250 (2001)
(“[N]o President (or his executive office staff) could, and presumably none would wish to,
supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.”).
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good cause.107 Judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would
force Congress to make policy decisions, thus restoring democratic
accountability. In contrast, citizens frustrated with a representative’s
legislative choices could elect a new representative the following term.108
B. Arguments Against Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine
Those who oppose meaningful application of the nondelegation
doctrine, the so-called “functionalists,” provide a number of reasons why
Congress should be permitted to delegate its legislative power. This
section articulates those arguments. The section that follows responds to
them.
i. Institutional Competency: Expertise and Accountability
One argument often advanced by functionalists is that Congress should
be able to delegate its legislative power because the executive branch, as
an institution, is more capable than Congress at making laws. They argue
that federal agencies have superior access to information and subject
matter expertise, gained through the use of experts, and thus are better
positioned than Congress to make the laws that govern the American
people.109
One of the leading advocates of this nakedly functionalist approach is
Professor Thomas Merrill, who asserts that Congress is better situated to
decide who should make the law than to actually make the law itself. In
other words, Merrill argues that Congress’s expertise lies in deciding
whether to delegate authority, not in policymaking. In his words:
“Congress, as a body of generalists whose principal area of expertise is
politics, should be able to resolve such questions of institutional choice
more effectively than determining the substance of specific policies.”110
107. Id. at 2247.
108. Others have similarly argued for the revival of the nondelegation doctrine as a means of
promoting democratic accountability. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132 (1980) (stating that the failure of legislators to legislate is one
of the major obstacles to a truly representative democracy); Schoenbrod, supra note 25, at 1243–
46 (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is essential to promoting responsibility among elected
officials); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 807, 821–22 (1999) (listing citizen apathy, arbitrariness, corruption, and a lack of
accountability as the costs of the Court’s failure to enforce the nondelegation doctrine).
109. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 124–26 (2000) (defending congressional delegations of lawmaking power
to administrative agencies in part because agencies have superior access to information).
110. Merrill, supra note 12, at 2164. Merrill argues that Article I, § 1 should be construed to
mandate the “exclusive delegation doctrine” instead of the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 2163.
Under the exclusive delegation doctrine, the executive branch may exercise legislative power as
long as Congress clearly authorized the agency to make legislative rules. Id. at 2100. Although
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He attributes this institutional incompetence to Congress’s decline in
political power after the New Deal. Merrill explains that although the
Framers understood Congress to be the most important branch of the
federal government, the massive growth in scale and complexity of the
government that occurred during the New Deal elevated the executive to
the forefront as the primary political power.111 He argues that the decline
in Congress’s power has created a “quiet crisis in constitutional law”
since the Constitution presupposes that Congress is the most important
policy-maker.112 He therefore asserts that the Court should resolve this
crisis by recognizing that Congress can delegate legislative power.113
Similarly, Professor Peter Schuck has argued that public participation
in lawmaking is most accessible, most meaningful, and most effective
within administrative agencies, not Congress, thus making the executive
branch much better suited for lawmaking.114 He writes:
The agency is often a more meaningful site for public participation than
Congress, because the policy stakes for individuals and interests groups
are most immediate, transparent, and well-defined at the agency
level. . . . After all, it is only at the agency level that the generalities of
legislation are broken down and concretized into discrete, specific
issues with which affected parties can hope to deal. It is there that the
agency commits itself to a particular course of action . . . . In short, it is
only at the agency level that the citizen can know precisely what the
statute means to her . . . .115

Professor Schuck also argues that public participation is most effective
at the agency level because the agency is where the public can best
educate the government about the nature of the problem Congress wanted
to address.116 To support his proposition that political participation is
Merrill recognizes that the executive branch does not inherently possess the power to act with the
force of law, he argues that Congress may give it this power. Id. at 2101.
111. Id. at 2159.
Today . . . [o]n virtually all matters of legislative policy, the Executive leads, and
Congress follows. Sometimes Congress can frustrate or impede the Executive by
refusing to enact legislation sought by the President, rejecting presidential appointments,
or modifying presidential appropriations requests. But only rarely does Congress take
the initiative in setting national policy.
Id.
112. Id. at 2162.
113. Id. at 2163. Merrill also attributes Congress’s decline in political power to the “persistence
of war in the modern era” which enhances the power of the president, “imperfect campaign finance
laws” which drive members of Congress to focus their attention on fundraising instead of
lawmaking, and the “growth of the national news media” which tends to magnify the president’s
power. Id. at 2159–60.
114. Schuck, supra note 23, at 781.
115. Id. at 781–82.
116. Id. at 782–83. Schuck attributes this phenomenon to both the “growing social complexity,”
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most meaningful at the agency level, Professor Schuck rejects the
argument that the agencies lack oversight and are shielded from public
accountability. He argues that while the agencies might not be directly
responsive to the voting public, they are nevertheless accountable to
diverse and powerful institutions, such as interest groups and the media,
which surround federal agencies like “watchdogs with sharp, penetrating
teeth” that restrain the agencies’ discretion.117
Professor Jerry Mashaw, in contrast, argues that executive agencies are
more accountable than Congress because they respond to the president.118
He explains that while voters select members of Congress based on the
representative’s effectiveness in providing goods and services to the
voter’s local district rather than based on the representative’s position on
various issues, voters elect a president based on the impact the president
will have on national policies.119 Thus, Professor Mashaw argues, the
president’s oversight of administrative agencies gives the voting public
an indirect say on agency action.120
ii. Delegation as Self-Policing
Functionalists also argue that Congress should be able to delegate its
legislative power because Congress is free to give its constitutionallyvested power away. After all, the argument goes, if Article I, Section 1 of
the Constitution vests all the legislative power in Congress, Congress
should be free to do with that power whatever it chooses.121 Justice
Stevens articulated this position in his Whitman concurrence. There he
argued that Congress’s delegation to the EPA to set national ambient air
quality standards, “the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are
requisite to protect the public health,” was plainly a delegation of
legislative power, but this does not make the delegation unconstitutional,
because Article I, Section 1 does not attempt to limit Congress’s ability
which he says has made it more difficult for congressional representatives “to accurately predict
the consequences of their choices so that they can reason their way to a conclusion as to the best
policy choice.” Id. at 778. He also attributes this trend to the fact that looming reelections
incentivize representatives “to think so obsessively about their immediate electoral prospects” that
they “may neglect longer term social problems whose solutions require immediate sacrifices for
delayed gains, problems that demand as much of the legislators’ attention, prudence, and political
courage as they can muster.” Id. at 777.
117. Id. at 783–84.
118. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95–96 (1985).
119. Id. at 95.
120. Id. at 95–96.
121. See Merrill, supra note 12, at 2129–30 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress the authority to transfer legislative power to other branches of government to “carry[]
into execution” the enumerated power granted to Congress).

390

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

to delegate its duty to make the law.122
Some who argue that Congress should be able to delegate its legislative
power if it so chooses justify this position by positing that delegation is a
self-regulating system. Jesse Choper, for example, argues that the
political branches will effectively police separation of powers violations
and because of this, “the ultimate constitutional issues of whether
executive action . . . violates the prerogatives of Congress . . . should be
held to be nonjusticiable . . . .”123 Others have expanded on this argument
by positing that because Congress will not want to give too much power
to the executive, it will rarely delegate without constraints.124
iii. Compatibility with the Modern Administrative State
Lastly, some functionalists argue that any rule that prohibits Congress
from delegating its legislative power should be rejected because it would
be incompatible with the modern administrative state.125 Indeed, the
Court echoed this position in Mistretta v. United States, when it stated:
“Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives.”126 One commentator has gone so far as
to argue that the administrative state falls outside the scope of the
Constitution’s structure. Professor E. Donald Elliott describes the
administrative state as a quasi-constitutional “fourth” branch, the rise of
which has “transformed the nature and functions of existing
institutions . . . .”127 Thus, he argues, it is “child’s play” to raise questions
122. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001); see also id at 488
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we
have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative
power.’”).
123. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263
(1980).
124. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation
of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 950 (1999) (“Congress is . . .
wary . . . of ceding too much authority to executive branch actors who may pursue their own policy
goals rather than those of the enacting legislative coalition. Legislators therefore set the limits of
executive branch discretion so that these costs and benefits of delegation balance at the margin.
Thus, legislators may well delegate authority to executive actors, but they will rarely, if ever, do so
without constraints. Moreover, legislators will delegate those issue areas where the normal
legislative process is least efficient relative to regulatory policymaking by executive agencies.”).
125. See Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern
Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 192 (2017) (“Restraints on delegation . . .
seem to some observers incompatible with our current, large-scale, powerful administrative
operations, and (in the more jaundiced view of this) efforts to revive a doctrine that would work to
constrain delegations are explicable as based primarily in hostility to the modern administrative
state.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1014 (2015) (“[T]he
importance of agency regulations in our legal system is hard to overstate.”).
126. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372. (1989).
127. Elliott, supra note 23, at 167.
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about the constitutional validity of administrative actions when the
existing Constitution was only made to accommodate three branches. 128
Despite their superficial appeal, these functionalist justifications are
seriously flawed. In the section that follows, I will explain why the stark
inconsistency of the functionalist model with the purposes and structure
of our constitutional framework dictates its categorical rejection.
C. A Response to the Functionalists
Each of these functionalist arguments ignores the very sensible reasons
why the Framers separated the legislative and executive powers in the
first place: to prevent the dangerous accumulation of power in one
branch, the very existence of which they characterized as the essence of
tyranny. The threat of tyranny—understood as the aggregation of power
in a single branch—is just as real today, if not even more so than it was
at the time of the framing. Congress’s continued loss of political power,
coupled with the current president’s blatant disregard of Congress’s
constitutionally authorized role, shows the looming danger caused by the
executive usurpation of legislative power.129 If Congress can delegate its
legislative power to the executive in the name of convenience or
expertise, the separation of powers established in the Constitution to
prevent tyranny collapses. And, as Jefferson wisely recognized, once
power has accumulated, it will be too late to stop it from degenerating
further.130
This vitally important point underscores how dangerously misguided
the functionalist arguments are. Let us assume, solely for purposes of
argument, the correctness of all of the functionalist defenses of unlimited
legislative delegation, grounded entirely in considerations of efficiency.
The fact remains that such arguments would still be misguided because
they totally ignore the foundational purpose of our constitutional
structure: preservation of representative democracy and prevention of the
accumulation of power, amounting to tyranny. A system grounded purely
in the values of efficiency would at best be agnostic in the choice between
democracy and tyranny. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that an
exclusive focus on the need for efficiency would point more toward the
128. Id. at 168. Professor Elliot may find support for his troubling position in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, where the Court’s categorization of the Federal Trade Commission as a
“quasi legislative” agency free from executive control seemed to recognize that the administrative
agencies can exist outside the existing three-branch constitutional structure. 295 U.S. 602, 628
(1935).
129. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text (discussing why the Constitution allocated
power to both the legislative and the executive branch).
130. JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 123–25 (“The time to guard against corruption and tyranny,
is before they shall have gotten hold on us. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust
to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have entered.”).
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choice of an authoritarian form of government than toward a democratic
one. After all, we know that the trains ran on time in Mussolini’s fascist
Italy. Our entire constitutional framework, however, is premised on the
primary goal of avoiding tyranny, regardless of the potential costs to
efficiency.
Perhaps one could respond that the concentration of political power in
the hands of the executive branch is wholly consistent with representative
democracy. But the Framers clearly disagreed, as is made evident by even
a cursory examination of unambiguous constitutional text. The very
concept of separation of powers is grounded in the importance of
prophylactic protection against tyranny.
Ultimately, any test that serves to balance separation-of-powers
interests in avoiding tyranny against the far more tangible interests of
convenience and expertise will never give the separation of powers
sufficient weight. Comparing the interest in avoiding tyranny to the more
tangible and immediate needs of convenience and expertise will not
assure that the foundational interests in avoiding tyranny will be
adequately protected. Justice Brennan recognized the unfairness of such
a comparison in the context of Article III’s prophylactic protections of
tenure and salary. In his dissent in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, Justice Brennan explained:
The Court requires that the legislative interest in convenience and
efficiency be weighed against the competing interest in judicial
independence. In doing so, the Court pits an interest the benefits of
which are immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the
benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem
remote and not worth the cost in any single case. Thus, while this
balancing creates the illusion of objectivity and ineluctability, in fact
the result was foreordained, because the balance is weighted against
judicial independence.131

It should be recalled that I have already rejected the argument that
delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies in no way
threaten democracy. This is so because these agencies are generally not
under the control of the elected president.132 But if that is true, then one
might question my argument that legislative delegations dangerously
empower the president by concentrating all political power in his hands.

131. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
132. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra
note 13, at 246) (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or
body . . . there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”).
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It could be suggested that we cannot have it both ways. But this would be
a flawed critique. First of all, not all legislative delegations go to
administrative agencies. Many are just as likely to go directly to the
executive.133 But democratic accountability is undermined even when
they go to administrative agencies because of agencies’ separation from
the electoral process.134 Finally, I categorically reject the suggestion that
Congress is free to delegate its own power. Separation of powers is not
designed to protect the individual branch; it is designed, rather, to protect
the people from the onset of tyranny. It is therefore not Congress’s
protection to waive.
Functionalists might well respond to my critique by pointing out the
obvious: despite the all but total absence of a meaningful nondelegation
doctrine, our system has not yet degenerated into tyranny. But such an
argument ignores the reason the Framers chose to view accumulation of
power as the equivalent of tyranny: once the accumulated power is in fact
abused, it is too late to stop the process. Indeed, we can understand the
danger of power accumulation simply by seeing how the current
president’s abuses of power were facilitated, if not caused, by the atrophy
of congressional authority.
In sum, each of the nakedly functionalist arguments advanced by
scholars as to why Congress should be permitted to delegate its legislative
power fails to rebut my thesis that the doctrine serves a vital role in
preserving the democratic structure and operation of the American
government. Those who reject the nondelegation doctrine argue that the
interests of convenience or expertise are more important than the
Constitution’s separation of powers. To accept this position would be to
accept the ominous risk of tyranny that comes with allowing Congress to
delegate its legislative power.
III. ARTICULATING A MODEL FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE: PRAGMATIC FORMALISM
In the prior section, I established that the functionalist attacks on the
nondelegation doctrine are, for the most part, dangerous and misguided.
Perhaps the strongest offense of the functionalist attack, however, focuses
on the difficulty of fashioning a guiding constitutional approach to
distinguish constitutionally legitimate exercises of congressional
lawmaking authority from unconstitutional delegations of that power.135
133. See infra Part IV (analyzing how pragmatic formalism handles the problem of national
emergencies).
134. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (identifying the powers the Constitution
vests in Congress and the president).
135. See REDISH, supra note 29, at 135–61 (discussing when a congressional delegation is
permissible and when it is impermissible).
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It is, to be sure, a complex and frustrating task. But if, as I have argued,
the nondelegation doctrine is centered in the fundamental constitutional
precepts of separation of powers, then the difficulty of setting a
constitutional standard for implementing the doctrine should certainly not
be deemed a justification for abandonment.
Admittedly, fashioning a standard that distinguishes legislative from
executive authority is no easy task. To be sure, it will often be relatively
easy to characterize certain actions as either lawmaking or the
implementation of a law, on a purely conceptual level. But the divide
between these functions becomes murky in situations where the
executive’s use of implementational discretion begins to blend into
policymaking. As Chief Justice Marshall aptly noted, distinguishing
legislative from executive authority is a “delicate and difficult
inquiry.”136 James Madison recognized this as well, writing that
“[e]xperience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its
three great provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the
privileges and powers of the different legislative branches.”137
A. Insufficiency of Existing Models
For reasons already explained, functionalist approaches to separation
of powers must be categorically rejected because they would permit the
legislative and executive powers to fall into the same hands.138 To
preserve the separation of powers, then, a standard for judicial
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine must begin from the formalist
perspective that Congress may not delegate its legislative power. But the
formalists, too, have failed to articulate a workable standard for
enforcement.
While I agree with the basic premise underlying formalist models—
namely, that Congress is not constitutionally authorized to delegate its
legislative power—the strict formalist theories adopt an overly rigid
definition of legislative and executive power and, as a result, ignore the
reality that because lawmaking is a complex process, Congress cannot be
expected to make every choice involving the exercise of discretion. For
example, one such formalist, Professor David Schoenbrod, argues that
Congress is constitutionally permitted to enact “rules statutes,” which tell

136. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 (1825).
137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 179 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
138. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 13, at 244 (“The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”).
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a party what they can and cannot do, but may not enact “goals statutes,”
which provide a policy goal but authorize executive branch discretion in
determining how best to achieve that goal.139 He believes that “goals
statutes” unconstitutionally delegate legislative power.140 Professor
Schoenbrod argues that “the statute itself must speak to what people
cannot do; the statute may not merely recite regulatory goals and leave it
to an agency to promulgate the rules to achieve those goals.”141 In other
words, under Professor Schoenbrod’s test, the executive branch cannot
decide how to implement Congress’s policy decisions.
Professor Ronald Cass offers an alternative formalist model for
judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine. Defining legislative
authority as the power “to prescribe rules for the regulation of the
society,”142 Professor Cass argues that the ability to make rules that apply
to settings in which executive officials traditionally have acted looks less
like “rules for the regulation of the society.”143 Thus, he argues, the Court
should distinguish legislative from executive power by asking whether
the authority conferred in a statute falls within the realm of the
constitutionally-prescribed executive power.144
Professor Cass’s model permits the executive branch to use its
discretion when implementing congressional policies, but only when the
task conferred in the statute falls within the range of responsibilities
typically handled by the executive. In this sense, Professor Cass’s model
defines executive power more broadly than Professor Schoenbrod would.
However, if Congress enacted a law articulating a policy regarding
commerce or immigration, for example, under Cass’s model an
139. Schoenbrod, supra note 25, at 1253.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1227. To illustrate the distinction between “rules” and “goals” statutes, Professor
Schoenbrod provides two examples. First, a statute establishing a tax at a given rate would be a
“rule statute,” as it provides a rule of conduct: to pay the tax at the specified rate. But a statute that
empowers the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to raise a certain amount of money by imposing
taxes as necessary to achieve that goal would be a “goal statute,” as the agency could decide how
to achieve Congress’s stated goal of raising revenues. Second, a statute limiting air pollution from
power plants at a given rate of emission would be a “rule statute” because it delineates permissible
from impermissible conduct. A statute that allows an agency to set controls on power plants in
order to reduce the total emissions from all power plants to a certain level, however, would be a
“goal statute,” as it allows the agency to decide how to achieve Congress’s goal of reducing total
emissions. Id. at 1253.
142. Cass, supra note 125, at 186 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 380 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992)).
143. Cass, supra note 125, at 186–87. He writes: “Attaching the policy decision to the exercise
of other tasks within the constitutionally prescribed missions of the other branches—deciding a
case or managing governmental resources—limits the likelihood that it will be an exercise of
legislative power.” Id. at 185.
144. Id. at 185.
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administrative agency implementing Congress’s policy could not
promulgate rules to achieve that policy goal.
The problem with each of these formalist articulations of the
nondelegation doctrine is that both theories offer a definition of executive
power that is too rigidly limited to function realistically in practice.
Professors Cass and Schoenbrod fail to recognize that it is often not
feasible for Congress to make all decisions involving some level of policy
choice. In these situations, Congress must rely on the executive branch to
make an on-the-spot determination as long as those choices are guided by
foundational normative policy directives determined by Congress.
One might be puzzled by what appears to be a functionalist critique of
these formalist theories, in light of my criticism of functionalist
approaches to separation of powers.145 But pragmatic formalism rejects
both functionalist and strict formalist separation-of-powers theories. It
rejects functionalist theories because they blatantly ignore the textuallygrounded prophylactic branch separation dictated by the Constitution.
But it also rejects strict formalist approaches to separation of powers,
because they ignore the fundamental pragmatic ether that surrounds the
Framers’ structuring of separation of powers in the first place. More
specifically, strict formalist theories ignore the foundationally pragmatic
reasons why the Framers chose to depart from the governmental structure
established by the Articles of Confederation by creating an executive
branch in the first place: to function as an arm of the federal government
designed to act swiftly and decisively when Congress itself could not
respond with sufficient speed. Under the Articles of Confederation, the
newly-formed federal government consisted of one political branch: a
Congress.146 In reflecting on the weaknesses of the Articles of
145. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (expressing skepticism with the
functionalist approach to separation of powers, in light of the current presidential administration’s
refusal to comply with Congress).
146. While scholars disagree about the reason why the Articles of Confederation lacked an
executive branch, two reasons seem most likely. On one hand, some have argued that the States
already had strong governments and the delegates feared that any centralized national government
would look too much like the British Monarch. JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 4 (1935) (“Any
attempt to create a permanent executive outside Congress smacked of monarchical tendencies and
would not be tolerated.”). Some have also argued that other, more pressing issues took priority.
This seems plausible, as the Articles of Confederation were not so much a constitution as a mutual
defense treaty establishing a “firm league of friendship” among newly-formed, co-equal states. See
Maggs, supra note 16, at 402–03. The debate at the time the delegates drafted the Articles did not
center on the relative strength of a centralized federal government but instead focused on the more
urgent issues of fighting the war and how to deal with public land in the West, Native American
relations, taxation, and representation. See Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and
Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution From the Confederation
Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of the Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783, 787,
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Confederation, the Framers realized that while Congress could pass laws
governing the conduct of the several states, it had no way to ensure
compliance with its laws.147
The Framers recognized another problem with the government
established under the Articles: Congress could not act with sufficient
speed in times of urgency. As Alexander Hamilton explained, Congress,
“numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, [could not] act with sufficient
decision.”148 The executive branch established in Article II of the
Constitution thus filled the need for a body that could enforce Congress’s
laws quickly and decisively. In short, the Framers established the
formalistic framework of the federal government with a full
understanding of the pragmatic implications of their chosen structure.
The Framers intended lawmaking to be an arduous, time-consuming
process. This was not by accident, given the express requirement in
Article I, Section 7 that enacting a law requires the approval of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate.149 To balance the intentionally
time-consuming process of legislation against the need for the federal
government to act quickly when it needed to do so, the Framers structured
the executive branch to include a single “magistrate” so that it could
function in a more nimble and fast-acting manner than Congress could.
As Hamilton explained:
In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
benefit. The differences of opinion . . . may sometimes obstruct salutary
plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to
check excesses in the majority. . . . But [these circumstances] constantly
counteract those qualities in the executive, which are the most necessary
ingredients in its composition[:] vigor and expedition . . . .150

The Framers understood “vigor,” “energy,” and “expedition” to be the
most necessary ingredients in the executive branch, which was created to
facilitate the “steady administration of the laws.”151 Indeed, the need for
816–27 (1993) (discussing how the Articles of Confederation emerged not from an ideological
conflict regarding the strength of the federal government, but instead from a convergence of other
debates).
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 17, at 74 (“In our case, the concurrence of thirteen
distinct sovereign wills is requisite under the confederation to the complete execution of every
important measure, that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen.
The measures of the Union have not been executed.”).
148. Letter to James Duane, supra note 17, at 404.
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States.”); see also INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (interpreting the Constitution
as requiring bicameralism and presentment for all legislation).
150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
151. See id. at 355 (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
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quick decision making is the reason the Framers rejected a jointpresidency.152
This history is instructive, not merely from an originalist perspective,
but also as a matter of common sense. Any theory for enforcement of
separation of powers in general or the nondelegation doctrine in particular
that ignores the pragmatic essence of the Constitution’s formalist
structure misses the fundamental conceptual subtlety of that structure.
Thus, neither functionalist nor formalist approaches articulate an
appropriate model for judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine.
Instead, the Court needs to fashion a doctrinal model that carves a path
between these two extremes, one that preserves the separation of powers
by infusing pragmatic consideration into the definitional framework of
governmental structure.
B. Pragmatic Formalism and the Nondelegation Doctrine
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the appropriate
means to implement the nondelegation doctrine is by use of “pragmatic
formalism”—a theory I originally developed as a broad theory of
separation of powers.153 Pragmatic formalism is grounded in the
formalist rule that because no branch may exercise any authority that falls
outside its constitutionally-granted powers, Congress is not permitted to
delegate its legislative power.154 This formalist approach to the
separation of powers is the only way to ensure the nondelegation doctrine

government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: It is not less
essential to the steady administration of the laws . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 137,
at 177 (“Energy in Government is essential to that security against external and internal danger,
and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good
Government.”).
152. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 150, at 356.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting the power in two or more
magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject
in whole or in part to the controul and co-operation of others, in the capacity of
counsellors to him.
Id.
153. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 27, at 452–53 (proposing “pragmatic formalism” and
applying it in the separation of powers context).
154. Gary Lawson articulated this “formalist” approach to the separation of powers when he
stated:
Any exercise of governmental power, and any governmental institution exercising that
power, must either fit within one of the three formal categories [legislative, executive,
or judicial] . . . or find explicit constitutional authorization for such deviation. The
separation of powers principle is violated whenever the categorizations of the exercised
power and the exercising institution do not match and the Constitution does not
specifically permit such blending.
Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 858
(1990).
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will serve the vital function of preventing the accumulation of both
legislative and executive powers in one branch. Accordingly, a court
applying pragmatic formalism does not wait until an accumulation of
power has occurred to decide whether the accumulation is “undue.” Nor
does it consider potentially competing policy rationales, such as
convenience and expertise, as would a functionalist model. Those
considerations ignore the outer linguistic limitations imposed by the
concept of legislative power: the argument that executive agencies may
possess more expertise in policymaking, even if assumed to be true, does
not alter the fundamental fact that the Constitution explicitly vests that
policymaking authority in Congress. Rather, under pragmatic formalism,
the Court has the exclusive role of determining whether Congress has
delegated its legislative power. If Congress has delegated legislative
power, the delegation is unconstitutional, and the inquiry ends there. No
competing policy reason can justify such a delegation.
Pragmatic formalism’s similarity to formalism, however, ends with the
adoption of this broad definitional framework. Unlike traditional
formalist approaches, which would invalidate nearly any exercise of
discretion by the executive branch as unconstitutional policymaking, I
advocate use of the “pragmatic” formalist model. Pragmatic formalism
adheres to the formal rule that Congress cannot delegate its legislative
power but defines “legislative” and “executive” pragmatically, by
resolving “twilight zone” definitional questions through reference to the
Framers’ reason for creating an executive in the first place: the need for
one branch of government to be able to make on-the-spot decisions in
order to meet the pressing needs of current events. But to be
constitutional, such decisions must be designed to implement a normative
policy choice made by Congress. Anything beyond that would constitute
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
Under the doctrinal framework I propose, a court determining whether
a governmental power being exercised is legislative or executive will use
two rules to guide its inquiry. First, in order for Congress to have
legislated (thereby complying with the restrictions of the nondelegation
doctrine), it must have made a political commitment that enables the
electorate to judge its elected representatives by examining how these
representatives voted on the legislation in question. With one narrow but
important exception discussed below,155 the existence of a political
commitment is a necessary condition for a court to find that Congress has
legislated. This is so because Congress performs its lawmaking role when
it enacts laws with enough specificity that voters can decide whether or
155. See infra Part IV.
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not they approve of a representative’s decision.156 For each branch to
have acted within its constitutionally-prescribed power, Congress must
provide the executive with a preexisting policy choice to execute. When
Congress enacts statutes containing overly broad directives, the executive
acts with freestanding legislative power, in violation of the nondelegation
doctrine.
Absent at least a minimum level of political commitment, a law must
be categorically deemed an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. But even when a law satisfies this minimal standard, ambiguous
situations will arise in which it will be unclear whether a particular policy
choice in deciding how to apply or interpret the broad legislative directive
should be characterized as legislative or executive. Many of these
decisions will require the exercise of an unguided discretion. To
determine whether these individualized decisions should be deemed
legislative or executive requires further refinement, above and beyond the
“political commitment” standard. Thus, second, consistent with the
pragmatic component of the theory, in close cases the Court will decide
whether an action is legislative or executive by reference to the
circumstances warranting that action. If Congress has made a proper
political commitment in enacting legislation, communicating to the
electorate a normative policy choice, discretionary implementational
decisions that demand immediate determination are properly defined as
executive. The legislation in question therefore properly vests executive
power. The crucial variable in this second inquiry is the extent to which
decision-making immediacy is required. If Congress realistically has the
opportunity to consider and make a legislative decision on the matter in
question, Congress cannot delegate that decision to the executive.
Congress can, however, vest in the executive the authority to make onthe-spot decisions that Congress itself, as a practical matter, would not be
capable of making in the time required. These decisions are properly
defined as executive in nature, for a decision cannot be considered
legislative if Congress could not have realistically been expected to make
that decision in the first place.
This pragmatic inquiry recognizes that lawmaking is necessarily a
time-consuming process and, because of this, Congress cannot feasibly
make all discretionary governing decisions.
Applying the pragmatic formalist model to the facts of the Supreme
Court’s well-known decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright helps to
illustrate the theory’s application. There, Congress had enacted the
following Joint Resolution:
156. See REDISH, supra note 29, at 5–16 (discussing the importance of popular sovereignty and
how Congress can ensure that citizens are well-informed when exercising their franchise).
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[I]f the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and
munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged
in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of
peace between those countries, and if . . . he makes proclamation to that
effect, it shall be unlawful to sell [any arms to those countries], except
under such limitations and exceptions as the President
prescribes . . . .157

Though the resolution was challenged as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, the Court upheld it on the grounds that
the president possessed unlimited constitutional authority over foreign
affairs.158 The Court’s reasoning finds absolutely no basis in either
constitutional text or structure. Indeed, Article I, Section 8 vests
numerous powers in Congress that implicate matters involving foreign
affairs.159 But while I reject the Court’s reason for finding the Joint
Resolution constitutional,160 I nevertheless agree with the Court’s
outcome. Viewed through the lens of pragmatic formalism, the decisionmaking power vested by the resolution in the president is properly
defined as “executive.”
A court applying the pragmatic formalist model to the Joint Resolution
would first ask whether Congress articulated a policy decision
appropriately characterized as a political commitment and provided
sufficient guidance in the Joint Resolution to the executive as to what the
goal to be reached actually was;161 Congress did just that. It articulated a
policy goal—achieve peace between the countries engaged in the armed
conflict in the Chaco. Furthermore, it delegated authority to the president
to take a specific action—prohibiting the sale of arms to those nations
engaged in the conflict—if the president determined, in light of
surrounding events, that such action would further attainment of
Congress’s expressly stated goal.
The next step for a court applying the pragmatic formalist model would
be to ask whether Congress itself could have feasibly made the decision
it chose to vest in the executive, i.e., whether it had the time to legislate
a ban on arms sales, or whether instead carrying out the policy decision
required an on-the-spot decision that could only feasibly be made by the
executive. Because the volatility of the situation in the Chaco might well
157. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936) (quoting H.R.J. Res.
347, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 Stat. 811 (1934)).
158. Id. at 320.
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress power to declare war).
160. In upholding the Joint Resolution, the Court reasoned that the power to control foreign
policy was an inherently executive function. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–21.
161. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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require a decision to impose an immediate ban on the sale of arms, the
decision to ban arm sales could not have feasibly been expected to come
from Congress. Thus, Congress properly vested this executive authority
in the president.162 Such a pragmatically-grounded definitional analysis
harkens back to the Framers’ decision to create an executive position,
despite their fear that creation of such a position might lead to tyranny.
The nation’s experience under the Articles of Confederation without an
executive had proven unworkable. Congress was simply unable to govern
day to day, given its severely limited powers. The situation involved in
Curtiss-Wright represents a more modern illustration of the exact same
pragmatic difficulty foreseen by the Framers.
C. Applying the Pragmatic Formalist Model
Applying the pragmatic formalist model to several of the Court’s most
prominent nondelegation cases demonstrates that, unlike the strict
formalist models, application of pragmatic formalism would not result in
the invalidation of nearly every legislative grant of decision-making
authority to the executive branch. Rather, as long as Congress has made
a sufficient political commitment in the controlling legislation, pragmatic
formalism affords the executive branch discretion in implementing
congressional policy choices when it would be infeasible for Congress
itself to make the decision in question.
i. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark
In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, the Court confronted a challenge to
an Act that allowed the president to suspend the duty-free status of certain
goods if the president found that the nation exporting those goods
imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” restrictions on
American imports.163 The Act also listed the amount of duties to be
collected for certain exports in the event that the president suspended a
product’s duty-free status.164
The first step in applying pragmatic formalism to the Act in order to
decide whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative power
would be to ask whether Congress made a policy commitment with
sufficient detail as to constitute a political commitment. Here, Congress
did indeed make such a commitment and thus carried out its duty to
162. Under Professor Schoenbrod’s theory, the Joint Resolution in Curtiss-Wright would be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because the Resolution articulated a goal and
allowed the president to use his discretion in carrying out the goal. But, if Congress could not have
feasibly made a policy commitment itself because of the need for a quick response, that decision is
not an exercise of legislative power.
163. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
164. Id. at 692–93.
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legislate. It decided that if a trading partner placed unreasonable
restrictions on American imports, the United States should respond by
similarly imposing duties on that nation’s exports. While the Act vested
in the president discretion to determine whether a nation’s restrictions
were “unequal and unreasonable,” it gave this discretion only to
accomplish Congress’s stated policy goal. The Act did not give the
president the freedom to decide whether to suspend the duty-free status
of goods whenever he chooses, which would amount to an
unconstitutional freestanding exercise of lawmaking power.
The second step in applying the pragmatic formalist model is to ask
whether, as a practical matter, Congress could have reasonably been
expected to make the decision it chose to delegate to the executive at the
time the decision needed to be made. If Congress’s chosen policy
required an on-the-spot determination that Congress itself could not
make, that determination may properly be defined as an executive
function. The circumstances of Marshall Field indicate that it would not
have been feasible for Congress to make the decision to suspend the dutyfree status of certain goods. Given that the duties imposed on goods
constantly fluctuate, it would not have been practical to expect Congress
to enact a new law each time another country imposed an unreasonable
restriction on American imports. Thus, under the pragmatic formalist
approach, Congress properly vested the president with the power to
execute its stated policy decision.
ii. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States
At issue in Hampton was a statute that granted the president the
authority to increase or decrease any tariff set by Congress if the president
found that the amount set by Congress did not equalize the difference in
cost of production between domestic and foreign producers. The Act also
provided that the president could not increase or decrease the rate by more
than fifty percent and provided four factors for the president to consider
when increasing or decreasing a rate.165 The Court upheld the Tariff Act,
reasoning that it provided “an intelligible principle” to the president.166
When viewed through the lens of pragmatic formalism, the Tariff Act
properly allows the president to execute a preexisting legislative policy
decision. In the Act, Congress articulated a policy with sufficient
guidance—i.e., that tariff rates should be set such that domestic producers
can compete on equal footing with foreign producers—and gave the
president the discretion to decide how to adjust the rates to achieve this
policy goal. The fact that the Act allowed the president to set rates does
165. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401–02 (1928).
166. Id. at 409.
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not render the president’s actions legislative. Practically speaking, it
would not have been feasible for Congress to pass a new law each time
the cost of an export increased or decreased so as to warrant a change in
rate.167 Thus, because Congress could not, as a practical matter, have set
each rate itself, delegating this task to the president is not appropriately
characterized as a grant of legislative power.
iii. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
In Panama Refining, the Court found that section 9(c) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which authorized the president to
prohibit the interstate transportation of “hot oil,” improperly delegated
legislative power to the president.168 A court applying a pragmatic
formalist model would arrive at the same conclusion. In section 9(c),
Congress did not state whether or under what circumstances the president
should prohibit the transportation of hot oil. Thus, because section 9(c)
failed to make a true political commitment, it was properly found to have
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. Pragmatic considerations
do not alter this categorization. As a practical matter, nothing prevented
Congress from deciding whether the transportation of hot oil should or
should not be banned. This was not a situation requiring a prompt, onthe-spot decision such that only the president could make it. Unlike the
Joint Resolution in Curtiss-Wright, where Congress articulated a policy
goal but could not be reasonably expected to act quickly enough to decide
whether to ban arms sales as a means of achieving peace in the region,
Congress encountered no such difficulty here. Congress’s delegation of
authority to the president to decide whether to ban hot oil therefore
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority.
iv. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
In Schechter, the Court invalidated section 3 of the NIRA, which
allowed the president to approve codes of fair competition when the
president found the codes necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act.169
Congress’s stated policy reason for the Act was, in part, to “provide for
the general welfare,” “eliminate unfair competitive practices,” and
“otherwise to rehabilitate industry.”170

167. Indeed, the Court recognized this when it stated: “[i]f Congress were to be required to fix
every rate, it would be impossible to exercise the power at all.” Id. at 407.
168. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
169. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521–23 (1935). Section 3
of the NIRA also provided that the president can only approve a code of fair competition if the
president finds that the group advocating for the code does not unfairly restrict membership and
that the code does not promote monopoly. Id.
170. Id. at 534–35.
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Viewed through the lens of pragmatic formalism, section 3
unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. Congress gave the
president the power to approve fair codes of competition without making
a political commitment as to what the codes should or should not prohibit,
facilitate, or regulate. Although Congress articulated the goals of
promoting the general welfare and eliminating unfair competitive
practices for the president to follow in deciding whether or not to approve
a code of fair competition, these goals are far too vague to provide the
electorate with any guidance in judging their elected representatives.
Congress provides sufficient guidance when it makes the necessary
political commitment such that voters who learn how their
representatives voted would be better informed about their
representatives’ positions.171 But here, Congress did not commit to any
concrete policy such that its constituents could hold their representative
accountable. Nor do pragmatic considerations suggest that Congress
properly allowed the president to execute the law. Surrounding
circumstances in no way prevented Congress from giving the president
more direction as to the types of codes he should approve or the specific
types of evils the codes should remedy.
v. Yakus v. United States
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 delegated to the Price
Administrator the power to set the prices of commodities if, in the
Administrator’s judgment, “prices have risen or threaten to rise to an
extent or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.” 172 The
asserted purpose of the Emergency Price Control Act was, among other
things, to stabilize prices, eliminate disruptive practices resulting from
abnormal market conditions, and to prevent a post-emergency collapse of
values.173 The Court upheld the Act against a challenge under the
nondelegation doctrine.174
Under the pragmatic formalist model, the Emergency Price Control
Act properly allowed the Price Administrator to execute Congress’s
preexisting policy decision. Here, Congress made the policy decision that
prices should be fixed if prices rise enough to threaten a collapse of value.
The Act gave the Price Administrator the discretion to decide when prices
have risen enough to threaten a collapse in value, but this discretion
cannot be viewed as legislative power because the decision is part of the
Administrator’s execution of Congress’s policy decision that constituted
171. See REDISH, supra note 29, at 5–16 (providing background on the political theories of
textualism and formalism in determining how the Constitution delegates governmental powers).
172. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 423.
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a clear political commitment. Contrast this discretion to hypothetical
legislation allowing the Price Administrator to decide whether prices
shall be fixed to prevent a collapse in value. Such an act would
unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. Additionally, pragmatic
factors further show that, in deciding whether to fix prices, the
Administrator executes the law. In the event of a threatened price
collapse, it would not have been feasible for Congress to legislate quickly
enough to remedy the problem. Thus, the ability to decide when to control
prices cannot be defined as legislative power.
vi. Mistretta v. United States
In Mistretta, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Reform Act, which gave a Sentencing Commission the power
to devise sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense. 175 In
delegating this task to the Commission, Congress provided seven factors
for the Commission to consider in setting sentencing ranges,176 mandated
that sentences could not exceed the statutorily established maximum,
provided that the maximum of a particular range could not exceed the
minimum by twenty-five percent or six months, and directed the
Commission to use the current average sentences as a starting point for
the new ranges.177 The Court upheld the Act against a nondelegation
challenge.178
Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, an evaluation under pragmatic
formalism demonstrates that the Sentencing Reform Act
unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. Although Congress gave
the Commission factors to consider in setting sentencing ranges,
Congress vested in the Commission the power to decide substantive
policy matters, such as the relative severity of federal crimes, whether
certain crimes have been punished too leniently or severely, and which
types of criminals should be treated similarly for the purposes of
sentencing. In establishing a sentencing range for federal crimes, the
Commission does not implement a pre-existing policy decision. On these
important issues of substantive social policy, Congress made no political
commitment. Instead, the Commission was authorized to make
fundamental policy decisions in deciding how to punish offenders.

175. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–74 (1989).
176. The seven factors provided in the Act are: (1) the grade of the offense; (2) the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances of the crime; (3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the
crime; (4) the community view of the gravity of the offense; (5) the public concern generated by
the crime; (6) the deterrent effect that a particular sentence may have on others; and (7) the current
incidence of the offense. Id. at 375.
177. Id. at 374–77.
178. Id. at 379.
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Although establishing sentencing guidelines requires time, expertise, and
resources, mere inconvenience does not transform a naked exercise of
lawmaking power into an executive task. Indeed, Congress could have
sought the advice and expertise of the Sentencing Commission as long as
it set the ranges itself. Practically speaking, there was no need for
Congress to vest the power to establish sentencing guidelines in the
executive branch, as this task did not require an on-the-spot decision.
vii. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.
In Whitman, the Court upheld section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act,
which requires that the EPA Administrator set national ambient air
quality standards, “the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are
requisite to protect the public health.”179 Contrary to the Court’s
conclusion, this delegation is clearly one of legislative power, and
therefore unconstitutional. First, Congress did not make any preexisting
policy decision for the Administrator to execute. Congress did not, for
example, decide under what circumstances an air pollutant harms the
public health, at what level of harm the Administrator should regulate a
pollutant, or what factors to consider when defining “health.”
Examination of practical considerations further show that this delegation
is legislative: nothing prevented Congress from providing additional
parameters as to the types of air quality rules the Administrator should
promulgate or when it should promulgate those rules.
As seen through its application to many of the Court’s most prominent
delegation cases, the pragmatic formalist model does not require
Congress to make every decision on its own, nor does it limit the
executive branch to purely ministerial tasks. To the contrary, the model
recognizes the need for executive discretion and creativity in numerous
contexts. Because the theory takes pragmatic factors into account in
defining the terms “legislative” and “executive” it allows the executive
branch to exercise discretion when that discretion facilitates its
implementation of congressional policies. This is true even when that
discretion involves some degree of policy choice because the exigencies
of the surrounding circumstances make it impractical for Congress to
make a decision itself. This was true in both Hampton and Yakus, where
Congress delegated the task of setting a rate or tariff to the executive
because the unwieldy nature of the legislative process effectively
prevented Congress from carrying out this task itself. Pragmatic
formalism thus differs from traditional formalist methods, which ignore
the practical realities of the legislative process. Importantly, the model
maintains the formal definitional inquiry by adhering to the constitutional
179. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
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dictate that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power. By doing so,
the pragmatic formalist model performs the vital functions of the
nondelegation doctrine: to preserve the separation of powers, prevent
tyranny, and preserve democratic accountability.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL EMERGENCIES: THE PRAGMATIC
FORMALIST ANSWER
A. Pragmatic Formalism and National Emergencies
It should now be clear that, in order for a statute to be constitutional
under pragmatic formalism, the theory’s foundational requirement is that
Congress has legislated, i.e., articulated a policy decision in the form of
a directive that constitutes a political commitment, enabling the voters to
make a judgment, up or down, about their elected representative on the
basis of how they voted on the law. As necessary as this formalist rule is
in preventing Congress from delegating its legislative power, this rule
requires a creative modification in the rare situations when it is simply
not feasible for Congress either to make such a political commitment or
provide meaningful guidance to the enforcing executive.
Most of the laws enacted by Congress are designed to correct a
preexisting problem. Typically, Congress knows of the issue it seeks to
address with legislation and can make a policy decision and shape a
directive after considering all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
For example, if Congress wants to limit carbon emissions from factories,
it can gather information about the situation and draft a law providing the
EPA with specific guidance as to how to remedy the problem. But when
Congress enacts a statute providing actions the executive branch can take
during generic times of emergency, it is, for the most part, infeasible for
Congress to legislate with any degree of particularity, because Congress
of course cannot predict how the future will unfold or the specific nature
of the future emergency.
Under an ordinary application of pragmatic formalism, Congress’s
failure to provide a detailed political commitment would dictate that the
statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. This result,
however, would unnecessarily prevent Congress from utilizing the
executive for the wise reasons the branch was created in the first place:
to act swiftly and decisively during times when Congress itself does not
have a reasonable opportunity to enact applicable legislative
directives.180 Thus, when enacting laws addressing generic future
national emergencies, Congress finds itself in a bind. If the Court were to
180. See supra Section III.A. (noting the importance of the executive branch, which can act
efficiently when Congress is unable).
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construe the nondelegation doctrine to require that all statutes articulate
a political commitment with sufficient guidance, Congress could not
enact laws giving broad, undefined directives to the executive during
times of emergency. And, once an emergency occurs, Congress cannot
act to respond to the immediate problem. In other words, in emergency
situations, adherence to the first tenet of pragmatic formalism would tie
Congress’s hands behind its back: Congress could neither respond to the
crisis, nor give even broad guidance to the executive as to how to respond.
To give Congress the flexibility it needs to utilize the executive branch
as intended, I propose that courts apply the pragmatic formalist model in
times of unforeseen emergency in a procedural manner.
Creative use of pragmatic formalism can provide a solution to this
seemingly intractable dilemma. On the one hand, the pragmatic element
of the model recognizes the practical reality that (1) the nation must be
able to respond immediately to unforeseen emergencies, and (2) as a
practical matter, the only branch in a position to deal with such a situation
immediately is the executive branch. Indeed, as previously noted, it is for
this very reason that the executive branch was established. On the other
hand, the formalist element of the analysis recognizes that allowing the
executive to exercise legislatively unguided emergency authority gives
rise to a prohibitive danger of an accumulation of power that threatens
tyranny. Hence I propose a procedural permutation of the pragmatic
formalist model: Congress may authorize the president to exercise
unguided policymaking power in the face of a true, unforeseen
emergency,181 but only for a period of time long enough to allow
Congress to legislate approval of the president’s actions (a period to be
determined in the individual case by the judiciary). If, within that time
period, Congress has not enacted legislation expressly approving the
president’s actions, his continuation of those actions is rendered
unconstitutional.
The period in which the executive may act during these emergencies
must be strictly limited. The executive may act only up until the point
when enough time has elapsed since the emergency began so that
Congress has had a realistic opportunity to affirm or reject the executive’s
response. But because the congressional role is so important as a matter

181. Pursuant to the so-called “constitutional fact” doctrine, factual issues on which the
constitutionality of governmental actions depends must be determined independently by the
judiciary. See generally Martin H. Redish & William D. Gohl, The Wandering Doctrine of
Constitutional Fact, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 290 (2017) (explaining the development of the
“constitutional fact” doctrine). Therefore, the issue of whether or not a true emergency exists must
be determined by the courts as a constitutional fact.
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of constitutional theory,182 the procedural version of the pragmatic
formalist model would require Congress to expressly approve that
response through the process of bicameral legislative action.183 Note that
this procedural modification does not require merely that Congress has
affirmatively rejected the executive’s chosen response to the emergency.
Rather, if enough time has passed so that it is reasonable to expect
Congress to have acted, the executive must receive congressional
approval to continue his or her chosen course of action. At that point, if
Congress is capable of acting, but has not formally approved the
executive’s actions, continuation of the executive action would be
deemed an unconstitutional exercise of freestanding legislative power.184
I recognize that this procedural modification of the rule that Congress
must have articulated a policy decision with sufficient guidance to have
legislated will be seen as radical. At first glance, the argument that a
statute can satisfy the nondelegation doctrine as a proper grant of
executive power when Congress has failed to articulate a policy choice
providing guidance to the executive seems to undermine any theory
rooted in formalism. The approach is not completely novel, however, as
it resembles the limits, properly understood, on the president’s discretion
to act under the Commander-in-Chief power during times of war.
The relationship between the president and Congress during times of
international military conflict basically follows an established
framework: Article I, Section 8 vests the power to declare war in
Congress.185 However, as the commander-in-chief, the president can
deploy the military before Congress has formally declared war if exigent
circumstances require immediate action. As the War Powers Act
provides:
182. See supra Section II.A (providing the framers’ theory in creating the legislative branch).
183. While this window of time will vary depending on the circumstances, it typically will not
exceed a couple of weeks.
184. In this sense, my theory can be contrasted to the approaches proposed by Justices Jackson
and Frankfurter in their Youngstown concurrences. In Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence, he
explained that in the absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority, “congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson likewise suggested that the
president may acquire the power to act after a “long-continued acquiescence of Congress.” Id. at
613. Contrary to both these positions, under my theory, the inertia is against, not in favor of, the
president. This is the only way to adequately prevent tyranny. Congress may be incentivized to wait
and allow the executive to act, for fear of upsetting its constituents with a difficult political decision.
The proposed procedural modification curtails the president’s discretion to act, even if Congress is
complacent. As discussed above, Congress cannot waive its duty to legislate. See supra Section
II.B (explaining that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power).
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.186

Under the Act, the president is permitted to function as commanderin-chief absent congressional approval—via a declaration of war or some
other statutory authorization—only in the case of a national emergency
created by an attack. While in recent years formal declarations of war
have not been required for extended use of the military, there does seem
to be an understanding and practice requiring some form of congressional
authorization. For example, during the Vietnam War, Congress enacted
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was widely construed to authorize
President Johnson to employ military forces in Southeast Asia, absent a
formal declaration of war.187 Similarly, during both Gulf wars, and three
days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed
an Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF), authorizing the
president’s extended use of the armed forces.188
The War Powers Act thus imposes a limit on the president’s power,
similar to the one imposed by the proposed procedural modification of
pragmatic formalism. Under the Act, the president can decide whether to
engage the nation’s armed forces absent congressional approval only
within the limited period before Congress has had time to act. After the
emergency has lapsed,189 the president may continue to act only with
congressional approval. Likewise, under the procedural modification of
pragmatic formalism, the executive can act to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,”190 absent congressional approval, only until the
point in time when Congress has had time to consider the executive’s
actions.191

186. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2018).
187. See Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (authorizing the
use of armed forces in Southeast Asia).
188. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991)
(authorizing the use of armed forces against Iraq); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the use of armed forces against terrorist groups
involved in the September 11 attacks).
189. See supra note 169 (explaining that Section 3 of the NIRA was invalidated because the
president does not have the power to approve codes of fair competition).
190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
191. I analogize to the War Powers Act only to show that the relationship contemplated between
the president and Congress in the procedural modification to pragmatic formalism is not wholly
novel. I do not root the theory in the Act itself, as I argue that pragmatic formalism and the
procedural modification are mandated by the Constitution, not any particular statute.
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B. Applying Procedural Pragmatic Formalism: The National
Emergencies Act
Applying this procedural modification of pragmatic formalism to the
National Emergencies Act (NEA) illustrates how the modification gives
Congress the flexibility it needs to use the executive to serve its intended
function of dealing with situations for which Congress is not structurally
suited, yet still prevents the executive from usurping legislative power.
Unfortunately, in its present form, the current version of the Act fails to
satisfy these constitutional requirements.
Enacted in 1976, the NEA sets out procedures that the president must
follow when declaring a national emergency. Prior to the passage of the
Act, no statute gave the president the authority to declare a national
emergency, so presidents who declared national emergencies did so
without any oversight from Congress.192 To restrict the president’s
discretion when declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that
the president must notify Congress immediately after declaring a national
emergency and that the president must specify the statute authorizing the
emergency power he seeks to exercise.193 Congress can terminate a
national emergency only by passing a Joint Resolution and enacting it
into law, which requires the president’s approval or a vote of two-thirds
of both houses.194
The NEA itself does not authorize any specific action the president can
take during an emergency. Rather, it simply authorizes the president to
declare a national emergency and provides procedures that the president
192. Patrick A. Thronson, Note, Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law
Regime, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 745–46 (2013).
193. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2018) (“With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the
exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the
President is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall immediately
be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.”); 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2018)
(“When the President declares a national emergency, no powers or authorities made available by
statute for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised unless and until the President
specifies the provisions of law under which he proposes that he, or other officers will act.”). The
NEA also provides that a national emergency may be terminated by a joint resolution enacted into
law, or by the president’s proclamation terminating the emergency, or, if the president fails to give
Congress notice that the emergency will continue, one year after its declaration. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1622(a) (2018); § 1622(d).
194. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(1) (stating that a joint resolution terminates a national emergency).
As originally passed, the NEA gave Congress a meaningful check on the president by providing
that Congress could terminate a national emergency via a concurrent resolution. National
Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (“Any national emergency declared by
the President in accordance with this title shall terminate if . . . Congress terminates the emergency
by concurrent resolution . . . .”). In 1983, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in INS. v. Chadha
that all binding legislation requires bicameralism and presentment required Congress to amend this
check on the president. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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must follow when making such a declaration. Once the president has
declared a national emergency pursuant to these procedures, the Act
unlocks over one hundred statutes giving him or her legal authority to
take specified actions during times of emergency. 195 But the NEA does
not give the president a blank check to act however he or she sees fit
during times of emergency, since any action the president takes must fall
within one of the codified emergency powers.196
Under a straightforward application of pragmatic formalism, a court
would find that the NEA impermissibly delegates legislative power, since
the Act makes no political commitment and fails to provide sufficient
guidance to the executive.197 At no point in the Act does Congress even
attempt to define “emergency,” nor does it provide any guidance as to the
types of circumstances that would constitute an emergency. Comparing
Congress’s directive in the NEA to the Joint Resolution at issue in
Curtiss-Wright illustrates this point. In the Joint Resolution, Congress
provided that if the president found that banning the sale of arms would
contribute to the reestablishment of peace in the Chaco, the president
could ban the sale of arms.198 The Resolution provided a specific action
the president can take—ban the sale of arms—only if the president found
that a specified event had occurred, and Congress’s choice of that
particular event simultaneously guided the president’s available actions
and informed the electorate of its policy decision.
In contrast, although the codified emergency power statutes provide
specific actions that the president is allowed to take, the NEA itself fails
to identify, even in broad terms, the specific types of events that must
occur in order to trigger availability of those actions. The only guidance
Congress gave the executive is that the president can act pursuant to the
codified emergency powers in the event of a “national emergency,” 199 a
term that is vague to say the least, and therefore susceptible to a wide
range of unchecked interpretations.

195. See 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (“Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be
exercised during a national emergency shall be effective and remain in effect (1) only when the
President (in accordance with subsection (a) of this section), specifically declares a national
emergency, and (2) only in accordance with this chapter . . . .”).
196. For this reason, a court considering whether the president acted constitutionally during
times of emergency must consider both the NEA and the codified emergency power under which
the president acted. The codified emergency powers vary in terms of the amount of guidance given
to the president so one could attack the statute granting the emergency power as lacking sufficient
guidance in violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
197. The first question a court applying pragmatic formalism asks to decide whether a statute
confers legislative or executive power is whether the statute contains a political commitment with
sufficient guidance. See supra Section III.B.
198. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936).
199. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a).
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Given the differing circumstances warranting the Joint Resolution
involved in Curtiss-Wright and the NEA, Congress’s lack of sufficient
guidance in the NEA makes sense. When enacting the Joint Resolution,
Congress was aware of the subject of its policy decision: the armed
conflict in the Chaco region. Even more importantly, Congress made
clear its normative policy choice in favor of peace, rather than, for
example, in favor of victory for one or the other of the warring
participants. But when drafting the NEA, Congress could not possibly
predict what emergencies would arise and thus could not articulate with
specificity the types of events that will trigger the emergency powers.
Although Congress surely could have provided more guidance in the
NEA—for example, by defining emergency as “an immediate and present
threat to the public safety requiring an urgent response”—even this
additional guidance would have failed to provide the requisite detailed
political commitment.
The proposed procedural modification of the pragmatic formalist
directive that Congress must articulate a political commitment with
sufficient detail solves this problem in the most practical manner
possible. A court applying the pragmatic formalist procedural
modification would not automatically invalidate the NEA as
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine. Instead, as long as the
president exercises the codified emergency powers only during times of
genuine emergency (as determined by the judiciary as a constitutional
fact) when Congress itself could not have had sufficient time to make the
initial policy decision responding to the new situation, the NEA properly
vests executive power in the president. This solution gives Congress the
flexibility it needs to rely on the executive during times of emergency,
yet restricts the executive’s actions to prevent a dangerous accumulation
of power. The president’s authority to act, however, dissipates absent
congressional legislative action approving his or her actions.
Measured by this standard, there are significant constitutional
problems with the NEA as currently structured. For one thing, the
proposed procedural modification applies only if Congress cannot
feasibly make an initial policy decision. If the president used the NEA to
make a policy decision at a time when Congress itself could have decided
whether or not to act, the procedural modification to pragmatic formalism
would not save such an application of the NEA.
One of President Trump’s recent actions serves as a perfect illustration
of an improper use of the NEA. In February 2019, frustrated by
Congress’s refusal to support his plan to build a wall along the United
States-Mexico border, President Trump resorted to his emergency powers
to obtain funding without congressional approval. Pursuant to the
procedures outlined in the National Emergencies Act, President Trump
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declared a national emergency to unlock the codified emergency power
that permits the Secretary of Defense to undertake military construction
projects not otherwise authorized by law.200 In the months leading up to
his declaration of emergency, President Trump had been negotiating with
Congress over funding for the wall. Once these negotiations failed,
Trump resorted to his emergency powers.201 Indeed, the president
admitted the non-urgent nature of the circumstances. During his
declaration speech he stated: “I could [build] the wall over a longer period
of time. I didn’t need to do this, but I’d rather do it much faster.”202
A court applying pragmatic formalism would find the president’s
actions under the NEA unconstitutional. Because the NEA governs only
those actions the executive branch can take during times of true
emergency, the lack of sufficient guidance in the NEA renders the statute
constitutionally vulnerable. In any event, President Trump’s use of the
NEA on this particular occasion, violates the nondelegation doctrine
under pragmatic formalism because there were no circumstances
requiring the president to act at a time when Congress itself was not
capable of acting. As seen through the ongoing negotiations between
Congress and the president, Congress had the time to address this issue
with legislation. Thus, by declaring a national emergency when there was
no genuine emergency, President Trump weaponized the NEA to vest in
him freestanding legislative power.
An even more important constitutional problem with the NEA is its
failure to comply with the formalist requirements of the procedural
modification. Under the terms of the procedural model, Congress,
through a process of bicameralism, would have to affirmatively approve
the executive action. It is only through this process that the constitutional
requirements of the formalist legislative process may be satisfied. 203 As
200. See 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2019).
In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national
emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act . . . that requires use of the
armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law,
may undertake military construction projects, and may authorize the Secretaries of the
military departments to undertake military construction projects, not otherwise
authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces. Such
projects may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been
appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing,
that have not been obligated.
Id.
201. See Baker, supra note 20 (explaining that President Trump declared the border a “national
security crisis” because of the “invasion” of drugs and criminals).
202. Id.
203. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that Congressional checks on
presidential powers are fundamental to the constitution).
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currently structured, however, the NEA requires a vote of two-thirds of
both houses of Congress to disapprove the president’s emergency
response.204 As a result, the inertia caused by the lack of legislative
response is in favor of the continuation of the president’s policy.
Pragmatic formalism, in contrast, demands compliance with the formalist
requirements of the legislative process. It is only in this way that we can
simultaneously preserve the separation of powers and accommodate the
practical needs of the modern world.
C. Applying Procedural Pragmatic Formalism: Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act
Applying pragmatic formalism to section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act and contrasting that provision to the NEA further illustrates the
limited application of the proposed procedural modification to
emergency circumstances. Section 232 authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce to “determine the effects on the national security of imports”
of any article and to advise a course of action to the president if the
Secretary determines that an article “is being imported into the United
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
impair the national security.”205 If the president agrees that a threat exists,
he or she shall “determine the nature and duration of the action that, in
the judgment of the president, must be taken to adjust the imports of the
article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair
the national security.”206 The Act lists factors that the president must
consider in deciding whether the import threatens the national security—
for example the domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements—but does not define “national security.”207 Under
the Act, the president has the ultimate authority to decide whether to
impose a tariff; any decision the president makes need not be approved
by Congress.208
Like the NEA, section 232 lacks a detailed political commitment on
the part of Congress. At no point in the statute does Congress define
“national security.” Although the provision lists factors that the president
must consider when making the determination, the statute gives the
president the ultimate authority to decide whether an import threatens
national security. However, unlike the NEA, which governs situations
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

50 U.S.C. § 1622(a).
19 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1)(A) (2018); § 1862(b)(3)(A).
§ 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
§ 1862(d).
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 32 (2019).
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where Congress cannot act quickly enough to decide how to respond to
an emergency, there is no reason, practically speaking, why Congress
cannot be the body to decide whether the United States should impose a
tariff on certain goods. The imposition of a tariff is not typically a
response to an emergency requiring instant action. In contrast, one of the
codified emergency statutes that the NEA unlocks allows the president to
take control of public airports,209 another permits the president to halt the
exportation of any agricultural commodity, 210 and a third permits the
president to suspend citizenship and nationality requirements for officers
on United States vessels.211 These actions are the types of responses to
an emergency that might need to go into effect immediately. When faced
with an emergency, Congress could not feasibly be expected to enact a
law to carry out any of these actions within the time required to enact
legislation. The imposition of a tariff, on the other hand, even if for
national safety, is typically a response to a far less-urgent problem, not
requiring immediate response, and thus Congress can make this decision
by resort to the traditional legislative process.
By their very nature, emergencies are unforeseeable events. The fact
that Congress cannot predict the future should not prevent Congress from
enacting broadly framed directives instructing the executive how to act
during these times. Indeed, one of the purposes of having an executive
branch in the first place is to ensure that the federal government is able to
respond quickly to urgent circumstances. The proposed procedural
modification of pragmatic formalism provides a creative solution to this
conundrum by allowing Congress to give broad directives to the
executive during times of emergency but at the same time preventing an
accumulation of power by strictly limiting the time in which the president
can act without formal legislative approval.
CONCLUSION
The ominous threat of tyranny that drove the Framers to separate the
legislative and executive powers has not dissipated since the time of the
Constitution’s creation. With the rise of the administrative state, the
executive branch has emerged as the dominant lawmaking force in
America. Meanwhile, Congress has continued to weaken. Coupled with
this aggregation of lawmaking power in the executive branch is the
209. See 49 U.S.C. § 47152(5) (2018) (authorizing government use of public airports without
charge during a national emergency).
210. See 7 U.S.C. § 5712(c) (2019) (authorizing the president to “prohibit or curtail the export
of any agricultural commodity” during a national emergency).
211. See 46 U.S.C. § 8103(h)(1) (2018) (authorizing the president to suspend Navy Reserve
citizenship requirements during a national emergency).
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current dysfunctional relationship between the president and Congress.
Over two hundred years after the Framers wisely allocated the powers of
the Federal Government to separate branches, this safeguard embedded
in the structure and text of the Constitution remains just as important
today as it was at the system’s inception. And as the Framers wisely
recognized, “power is of an encroaching nature”; the time to stop the
accumulation is before it begins.212
Judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine preserves the
separation of powers and, in so doing, helps us avoid the path to tyranny.
It is therefore imperative that the Court revisit the nondelegation doctrine,
in order to recognize the doctrine’s pivotal role in maintaining the
American structure of government. The constitutional mandate vesting
the legislative power in Congress cannot be overridden by the interests of
convenience and expertise. If the Court continues to uphold broad
delegations of legislative power in the name of functionalism, it will leave
the American democratic structure of government vulnerable to attack or
atrophy.
My goal in this Article has been to propose a method that will enable
the Court to enforce the nondelegation doctrine in a way that does not
require Congress to make every decision, but nevertheless adheres to the
rule that Congress may not delegate its legislative power. The pragmatic
formalist model fills a void left by the insufficiencies of both the nakedly
functionalist and strict formalist models. This proposed model of
separation of powers bridges the gap between these two theories by
adhering to the formalist rule that Congress cannot delegate its legislative
power but by defining “legislative” and “executive” pragmatically. If
adopted, pragmatic formalism would help achieve the central purposes of
the nondelegation doctrine: to preserve the separation of powers, to
prevent tyranny, and to promote democratic accountability.

212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 101, at 250.

